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Charity in the 21st Century
PART I. INTRODUCTION
The turn of the century seemed to bring with it a sharply critical
focus on charity.' Under federal tax law, a charity includes organizations that
are "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes." This single
phrase provides a standard not just for tax exemption for over 1.2 million
organizations (which are diverse in purpose, size, function, complexity, and
effectiveness) but also access to several tax and nontax preferences,
including eligibility to receive tax deductible contributions (for income,
estate, and gift tax purposes), 2 access to tax-exempt financing,3 State
property tax exemptions, and regulatory relief, among other benefits.' The
concerns about charities surfaced largely through press reports and are
legion: spending of earmarked contributions for non-earmarked purposes;
excess compensation to organization insiders; mission drift-deliberate, or
aided by faulty corporate governance; acceptance of property contributions
when donors or others are the principal beneficiaries; participation in illicit
tax shelter transactions; spending for non-charitable purposes; accumulations
of income; failure to provide charitable services; use of the charitable form
for non-charitable purposes; questionable investment practices; participation
in political campaigns; and self-dealing transactions, to name a few.
The response to ongoing scandals by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) and the Congress was mixed. As the scandals unfolded, the IRS
continually pointed to abuses and the need to address them,' but also asserted
1. For ease of reference, when used in this Article, the terms "charity" and
"charitable organization" include reference to the principal organizations described
in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code"). This
includes religious, charitable, scientific, literary, and educational organizations.
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to such Code.
2. IRC §§ 170, 2055(a)(2), 2522(a)(2).
3. IRC § 145.
4. See Evelyn Brody, All Charities are Property Tax-Exempt, But Some are
More Exempt Than Others, 44 New Eng. L. Rev. 621 (2010); Janne Gallagher, The
Legal Structure of Property-Tax Exemption, in Property-Tax Exemption for
Charities 3 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002).
5. See Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, 109th Cong., Historical
Development and Present Law of the Federal Tax Exemption for Charities and Other
Tax-Exempt Organizations, at Appendix (Joint Comm. Print 2005) [hereinafter JCT
Historical Development] (including in Appendix a memorandum by Congressional
Research Service that documents a variety of benefits provided to charitable
organizations under Federal and State law).
6. The reported scandals are surveyed and discussed in Part III of this
Article.
7. See Letter from Mark W. Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to
The Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. On Fin. 3 (Mar. 30, 2005),
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that the charitable sector is "compliant," notwithstanding a minimal
examination rate.8 As part of its enforcement efforts, the IRS completed an
available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Letter%20from%20Everson.pdf
("We are concerned that tax-indifferent parties are being used as accommodation
parties to enable abusive tax shelters."; id. at 5 ("[Some charities are] established to
benefit the donor . . . a donor receives a charitable contribution deduction while
maintaining control over the contributed assets, often using them for personal
gain."); id. at 7 ("We also have persistent problems in taxpayers' valuation of
deductions taken for non-cash charitable contributions."); id. at 8 ("[T]here is a
major risk that organizations that effectively allow key executives too great a voice
in determining their own compensation will not end up with objective and
reasonable compensation levels."); id. at 13 ("In many areas of our jurisdiction, our
remedial tools are not effective. Often our only recourse is revocation of tax-
exemption, a 'remedy' that may work a disproportionate hardship on innocent
charitable beneficiaries . . . . Moreover, even where we have an intermediate
sanction, it may not work as intended."); Charity Oversight and Reform - Keeping
Bad Things from Happing to Good Charities: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Fin.,
108th Cong. 128 (2004) (written statement of Mark W. Everson, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue) ("[T]here are abuses of charities that principally rely on the tax
advantages conferred by the deductibility of contributions to those organizations.");
id. at 130 ("[W]e have seen business contracts with related parties, unreasonably
high executive compensation, and loans to executives."); id. at 134 ("[S]tronger
governance procedures are needed for exempt organizations."); id. at 138 ("IRS has
no sanctions [to address participation by exempt organizations in tax shelter
transactions] comparable to those that can be imposed on promoters or investors.").
8. See Tax-Exempt Charitable Organizations: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong. 12 (2007)
(written statement of Steven T. Miller, Commissioner, Tax Exempt and Gov't
Entities Div., Internal Revenue Serv.) (noting that although compliance "problems
do exist . . . on the whole, the charitable sector is very compliant with the Tax
Code"). Steven Miller's comments came one year after passage of the PPA (and
after control of Congress shifted from Republican to Democrat); whereas Mark
Everson's comments, supra note 7, preceded enactment of the PPA. During his oral
testimony, Miller provided some data on exams of tax-exempt organizations
(including more than just charitable tax-exempt organizations): "Last year we
examined more than 7,000 returns, up 23 percent from 2003 and the most we have
examined since the year 2000." Id. at 10. Representative Xavier Becerra questioned
Mr. Miller about this statement, confirming that the 7,079 returns examined were of
the universe of 1.8 million tax-exempt organizations for an exam rate of less than
one-half of one percent. Id. at 110-111. Intimated, but not explicitly laid out in Mr.
Miller's testimony was that the examinations conducted were not necessarily audits,
but compliance checks of an information return (e.g., the Exempt Organization
Compliance Unit "contacts taxpayers by letter to conduct 'compliance checks' or to
obtain information for studies"), with the result that the audit rate is lower than the
"examination" rate stated above. Id. at 17. In another exchange with Mr. Becerra,
Mr. Miller spoke about the process of reviewing applications for charitable tax-
exempt status, noting that for the vast majority of the approximately 55,000 new
4 [VOL 11:1
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ambitious overhaul of the annual information return charitable (and other
tax-exempt) organizations file each year (the Form 990);9 undertook
intensive studies on the two largest segments of the charitable sector:
hospitals,'o and colleges and universities;" made an inquiry into executive
compensation practices;' and raised new questions about governance. 3 The
organizations applying each year, "it is the only time we will ever have a real one-
on-one conversation with them." Id. at 110.
9. Effective for the 2008 tax year, organizations with gross receipts of at
least $1 million or total assets of at least $2.5 million were required to file the
redesigned Form 990. (The thresholds decrease to $500,000 gross receipts and $1.25
million total assets for the 2009 tax year and $200,000 gross receipts and $500,000
total assets for the 2010 tax year.) See Form 990 Redesign for Tax Year 2008 (Filed
in 2009): Effective Date of Redesigned Form, IRS.gov, http://www.irs.gov
/charities/article/0,,id=176671,00.html. (last reviewed or updated Nov. 15, 2010).
According to the IRS the new form was needed because
"[fJorm 990 ha[d] not been significantly revised since 1979, and it [wa]s
universally regarded as needing major revision. It ha[d] failed to keep pace
with changes in the law and with the increasing size, diversity, and
complexity of the tax-exempt sector. As a result, the [old] form fail[ed] to
meet the Service's tax compliance interests and the transparency and
accountability needs of the states, the general public, and local communities
served by the organization."
See Form 990 Redesign for Tax Year 2008 (Filed in 2009): Purpose of Form 990
Redesign, IRS.gov, http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,,id=176670,00.html (last
reviewed or updated Jan. 21, 2011).
10. See IRS, Exempt Organizations (TE/GE), Hospital Compliance Project;
Final Report (2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/frepthospproj.pdf (178-page
report assessing the community benefit activities and executive compensation
practices at charitable hospitals, based on information from over 500 questionnaires
to hospitals sent by the IRS).
11. See IRS, Exempt Organizations, Colleges and Universities Compliance
Project: Interim Report (2010), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/cucpinterimrpt
052010.pdf; News Release IR-2008-1 12 (Oct. 1, 2008) ([T]he questionnaires are
part of "the agency's focused effort to study key areas in the tax-exempt
community. The college and university questionnaire will focus on unrelated
business income, endowments and executive compensation practices. The
questionnaires are being sent to a cross-section of small, mid-sized and large private
and public four-year colleges and institutions.").
12. See IRS, Report on Exempt Organizations Executive Compensation
Compliance Project - Parts I and II (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/exec._
comp.final.pdf (reporting on results of compliance check letters sent to 1,223
organizations in 2004 and examinations of 782 organizations). The report concludes
that there was not evidence of "widespread concerns other than reporting" but since
"this was not a statistical sample, no definitive statement can yet be made concerning
2011] 5
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IRS's continuing actions indicate, at a minimum, suspicion that the
charitable sector indeed has large pockets of noncompliance and that
oversight, or the perception of it, is necessary. But the IRS can only do so
much. Meaningful change of any underlying weaknesses in the tax law of
charities ultimately must come from Congress.
Congress clearly was moved by the heavy volume of bad press about
charities. The many reported scandals directed attention to the size of the
sector and the importance of the charitable designation apart from just tax
exemption. This in turn raised the issue of the sufficiency of a broad
purpose-based approach to defining charity, and highlighted weaknesses in
the law's ability to respond to abuse. The reported scandals also undermined
the prevailing manner of categorizing charity as either "public," and thus
legally preferred for exemption, deductibility, and compliance purposes, or
"private," and thus subject to a series of anti-abuse rules. The many scandals
at public charities were strong indicators that the public designation of
present law was not sufficient to protect against abuse. In some cases, the
public charity form was used precisely to escape the rigors of the private
foundation regime. In others, public charities engaged in questionable
conduct that might have been subject to sanction had the charity been a
private foundation. Moreover, the series of abuses by donors with respect to
contributions of non-cash property to public charities further, albeit
indirectly, raised the question of the distinction between the two types of
charity, considering that different deductibility rules apply with respect to
each. In short, the all-or-nothing nature of tax exemption, the relative
absence of bright enforcement lines, the paucity of intermediate sanctions,
combined with unchecked growth of the charitable sector, a very low audit
rate, and limited enforcement resources made it increasingly evident that
some change was warranted.
The decibel level reached a crescendo mid-decade with multiple
hearings, reports, and detailed legislation, most significantly, Title XII of the
Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA).14 The PPA, among other things,
fashioned new restrictions for many kinds of charitable contributions and
the compliance level in this area. Continued work in the area of executive
compensation is warranted." Id. at 1.
13. Sarah Hall Ingram, Commissioner of Tax-Exempt and Government
Entities, IRS, Remarks at the Georgetown University Law Center Conference: Issues
in Nonprofit Governance (June 23, 2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/ingramgtowngovernance062309.pdf; see Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer &
Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First Century: An
Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 479 (2010); James J. Fishman,
Stealth Preemption: The IRS's Nonprofit Corporate Governance Initiative, 29 Va.
Tax Rev. 545 (2010).
14. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006).
6 [VOL 11:1
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essentially created new hybrid forms of charity." Yet although the PPA is
the most significant legislation affecting charitable organizations since 1969,
the PPA's significance may lie less with the particulars of its directives than
with the legislative precedents it established: precedents for distinct
charitable exemption standards based on the type of organization, a
weakening of the basis for distinguishing among charities as "public" or
"private," and a related preference for brighter enforcement lines and
frustration with the status quo. In short, the PPA represents an effort at
piecemeal reform of the charitable designation. What has occurred in the
past several years-through scandal and legislation-has been a sustained
challenge to the longstanding way in which charity is perceived, and
ultimately, regulated.' 6 The time is ripe for a reexamination of how charity is
governed for federal tax purposes. It is likely that until such an examination
occurs, charity will not readily return to its comfortable place out of the
critical spotlight.
This Article is an effort to spur such a reexamination. Part II of this
Article provides a snapshot of the historical development of the federal
income tax law relating to charity in the twentieth century and shows that the
statutory law has passively accommodated significant growth of the
15. This was accomplished through new rules for donor advised funds and
supporting organizations. These and other provisions of the PPA are described infra
text accompanying notes 99-105 and 130-142.
16. Of course, charity has been under siege before, most notably in the
1940s and the 1960s. On both occasions, however, the result was reform legislation
fairly well targeted to the perceived abuses. Introduction of the unrelated business
income tax (UBIT) and related reforms in 1950 closed the door on tax-exempt
charitable businesses. See generally Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, 64
Stat. 906; IRC §§ 511-514. For an excellent history of the UBIT see Ethan G. Stone,
Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political Function of the
Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 Emory L. J. 1475 (2005). For discussion of the
rationales of the UBIT, see id. at 1488-1494; Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair
Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 Va. Tax. Rev. 605 (1989).
See also JCT Historical Development, supra note 5, at 100-109. In 1969, the separate
classification of private foundations from other (better) charities, and promulgation
of special anti-abuse rules with respect to foundations, largely put to rest years of
concern about endemic abuse in the private foundation world. The Tax Reform Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487; IRC §§ 509, 4941-4945. In the lead-up to
the 1969 legislation, Congressman Wright Patman conducted a number of
investigations into private foundations and published three reports. Staff of H. Select
Comm. on Small Business, 89th Cong., Tax-Exempt Foundations and Charitable
Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy (First Installment 1962, Second Installment
1963, Third Installment 1964). Subsequently, in response to Congressional requests,
the Treasury Department issued a report that became the foundation for the seminal
changes enacted in 1969. Staff of S. Comm. On Fin., 89th Cong., Treasury
Department, Report on Private Foundations (Comm. Print 1965).
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charitable sector without demanding any rigor of the sector in the form of
positive requirements or quantitative measures. This has led to growth
without meaningful oversight-a recipe for continuing problems. Part III of
this Article provides an overview of many of the scandals that engulfed the
sector during the early twenty-first century and shows that the scandals
(regardless of their underlying merits) not only seriously eroded the "halo"
effect of charitable organizations and enabled passage of reform legislation,
but also illustrated the consequences of unchecked growth. Part IV of the
Article discusses the central features of current law that are under pressure in
part because of this growth without oversight. As highlighted in this Part I,
these are the breadth of the charitable standard, a regulatory framework
based on the distinction between public charity and private foundation, and a
facts and circumstances and all-or-nothing approach to enforcement. This
Part of the Article also shows how the reform legislation enacted in 2004-
2006 and in 2010, though not comprehensive reform, nevertheless planted
seeds indicative of a shifting legislative policy toward charity, one that
favors more substantive distinctions among charities for exemption purposes,
undermines the current basis for distinguishing among charities, and points
toward a need for brighter enforcement lines. Part V of the Article suggests
that such piecemeal reform should be understood as a symptom of the law's
inability to make substantive demands upon charitable organizations, and
that absent a rethinking of how we regulate and define charity, the trends
established by recent legislation are likely to continue. The Article concludes
that the time to reconsider the current framework is upon us, and suggests a
new approach based on developing different standards for the charitable tax
benefits in order to focus our attentions more directly on the tax system's
support for the charitable sector.
PART II. SYNOPSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAX PREFERENCE
FOR CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS - OPEN ENDED GROWTH
A review of major developments in federal charity tax law in the
20th century shows that although the rules have largely accommodated
growth of the charitable sector, such growth has not been paired with any
material demands upon charitable organizations.
From the outset of the federal income tax in 1913, there has been an
exemption from tax for:
"any corporation or association organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational
8 [Vol. 11:1
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purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder.""
This initial charitable exemption had the following eight
characteristics:
(1) The exemption was self-enforcing. There was no requirement
that the organization apply for the exemption or report regularly
to make sure the statute's terms (such as they were) continued to
be met.
(2) No limits were placed on the activities of a charitable
organization.18
(3) The exemption was a complete or blanket exemption, that is,
it covered all of a charitable organization's income.
(4) The exemption applied equally to all organizations meeting
its terms. No effort was made to distinguish among charitable
organizations.
(5) The exemption was all or nothing: either the organization
met the requirements and was free from income tax or it did not
meet the requirements and was subject to income tax.'9 There
were no alternative or "intermediate" sanctions. The answer to
the exemption question was based on the facts and
circumstances, i.e., there was no bright line test.
(6) The exemption was conditioned on a "good" purpose; no
effort was made to define in any substantive way what such a
17. The Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590. Additional
purposes were later added to the list: the prevention of cruelty to children or animals
(1918), literary purposes (1921), testing for public safety (1954) (note that unlike
other organizations described in section 501(c)(3), contributions to public safety
organizations are not deductible), and to foster national or international sports
competition (1976). The 1913 Act was not the first statutory effort to exempt
charitable organizations from income tax. See the Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 73,
28 Stat. 570 (declared unconstitutional by Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
158 U.S. 601 (1895)). In addition, an excise tax on corporate incomes imposed in
1909 also provided for a similar charitable exemption. The Payne Aldrich Tariff Act
of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11.
18. In 1919, however, the Treasury adopted a regulation for purposes of the
charitable contribution deduction of 1917 stating "associations formed to
disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda are not educational within the
meaning of the statute." Reg. 45, art. 517 (1919), in T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int.
Rev. 285 (1920).
19. This stems from the requirement that the organization be "operated
exclusively for" charitable or other purposes, and the present tense of the no private
inurement restriction, which ensures that the purpose and inurement requirements are
ongoing (i.e., "no part of the net income of which inures to .... .").
2011] 9
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purpose might consist of in concrete terms, based on outcome,
content, or other quantifiable measure.
(7) The exemption was conditioned on the private inurement
restriction; that is the profits of the organization were required to
go to the good purposes of the organization, and not be paid out
20to private persons or private interests.
(8) The standard for tax exemption was used as a basis for other,
distinct tax benefits. For example, as of 1917, the language of
the exemption was linked to a federal income tax deduction for
contributions to organizations meeting the exemption's
requirements.2 ' That is, there were no separate tests required: if
an organization qualified for the charitable exemption, the
organization also was eligible to receive tax-deductible
contributions.
It comes as no surprise that today, almost 100 years later,22 the law
has changed significantly. For instance, the tax preference is not self-
enforcing. Over time tax exemption became conditioned on an explicit
determination by the IRS, and was subject to ongoing oversight. Thus,
applications for tax exemption 23 and annual information return filingS24 are
20. The private inurement restriction is now commonly referred to as the
"nondistribution constraint" and is a distinguishing feature of the charitable form.
See Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 Yale L. J. 54, 56 (1981).
21. See War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
22. The current exemption language reads:
"Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net eamings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided
in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office."
IRC § 501(c)(3).
23. The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(a), 83 Stat.
487; IRC § 508.
24. The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(d)(1), 83 Stat.
487; IRC § 6033. The annual information return provides the basis to enforce the
Charity in the 21st Century
required for most 2 5 charitable organizations, and a separate division of the
IRS exists to police, educate, and serve the charitable sector.26 In addition,
Congress decided that certain activities were inconsistent with tax
exemption. Accordingly, charities may not participate in political
campaignS27 or engage in substantial lobbying. 28 Limitations also apply to the
investment and spending activities of private foundations. 29 Further, the
exemption from income tax today is not a blanket exemption. All charitable
organizations are subject to tax on income from business activities that are
not related to the organization's charitable purpose;30 and some charitable
organizations (i.e., private foundations) are subject to tax on their investment
income.3 ' Finally, the exemption no longer applies equally to all charitable
operational test and the many other requirements of the charitable tax preference.
Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-235, § 117(a), 58 Stat. 21 (1943) (requiring
that certain organizations file information returns, excluding religious organizations,
schools, certain fraternal organizations, certain government entities, and publicly
supported charitable organizations).
25. Churches, certain other religious or very small organizations (e.g.,
public charities with not more than $5000 in annual gross receipts), and other
organizations excepted by regulation, are not required to file an exemption
application with the IRS or file an annual information return. IRC §§ 508(c),
6033(a)(3).
26. The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, ushered in a major restructuring of the IRS,
including the division of the IRS with oversight of tax-exempt organizations, the
Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division (TE/GE). Prior to the 1998 Act,
oversight of charitable organizations was conducted by a smaller office.
Enforcement of the charitable tax preference is not unified within the IRS, however.
Although TE/GE has jurisdiction over tax exemption, a separate division within IRS
has jurisdiction over the charitable deduction. For a description of the organization
of TE/GE, see Bruce Hopkins, The Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 2.2(b) (9th
ed. 2007).
27. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 163; IRC § 501(c)(3) (a
charity may "not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to)
any candidate for public office").
28. The Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 700; IRC § 501(c)(3) (a charity is
not exempt unless "no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation").
29. Private foundations are subject to excise taxes for various
transgressions, which arguably could be characterized as limits on certain types of
activities (e.g., risky investments, excess holdings of a business, and non-charitable
spending). See IRC §§ 4943, 4944, 4945.
30. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 301, 64 Stat. 906; IRC §§
511-514.
31. The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(b), 83 Stat.
487; IRC § 4940.
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organizations. Charities are divided into broad categories: public charities
and private foundations;3 2 with the former being preferred to the latter for
purposes of the charitable deduction, tax exemption,34 and permissible
activities and surveillance.3 s
These changes are all significant legal responses to experience with
charitable organizations over the course of a century. Yet of the eight initial
characteristics of exemption described above, the changes pertain to the first
four (self-enforcing, blanket exemption, unlimited activities, and no
distinction among charities). There has been less change with respect to the
other four initial characteristics. Indeed, much of the foundational statutory
laws and historical approaches to charitable status and enforcement have
remained the same. The two core statutory requirements of the 1913
exemption are unchanged: charitable exemption still (of course) requires a
"good" purpose (and in general the statutory law does not attempt to quantify
the purpose);36 and the exemption still is conditioned on the private
32. The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(a), 83 Stat.
487; IRC § 509 (defining a private foundation). As discussed infra, the PPA has
complicated the public charity-private foundation division by recognizing donor
advised funds and supporting organizations as in effect something of a hybrid of the
two.
33. A donor to a public charity is allowed to deduct more as a percentage of
the donor's income than a donor to a private (nonoperating) foundation. IRC §
170(b).
34. Private foundations are required to pay a tax on their net investment
income. Public charities do not have to pay such a tax. IRC § 4940.
35. Private foundations are subject to excise taxes that do not apply to
public charities for a variety of missteps. IRC §§ 4941-4945.
36. Of course, a century's worth of experience provides considerable
precedent as to what qualifies as a charitable organization as determined over time
by the IRS and the courts. For a description of the many types of organization that
are described in § 501(c)(3), see Hopkins, supra note 26, chs. 7- 11. Hopkins denotes
in categorical and specific terms the many organizations that qualify as § 501(c)(3)
organizations. These include organizations that provide relief for the poor; relief for
the distressed; housing; down payment assistance; credit counseling; health
(including hospitals, clinical departments of hospitals, medical research
organizations, homes for the aged, health maintenance organizations, integrated
delivery systems, peer review organizations, fitness centers, and other health care
organizations); relief of the burdens of government; organizations that advance
education, science, or religion (such organizations are distinct from educational,
scientific, or religious organizations proper, i.e., the advancement of a non-charitable
§ 501(c)(3) purpose is considered a charitable purpose); organizations that promote
social welfare, the arts, patriotism, or sports; environmental organizations; local
economic development organizations; educational institutions (colleges and
universities, schools, museums, libraries); day care centers; organizations engaged in
an educational activity (e.g., vocational training, subject-specific instruction (dance,
sailboat racing), the conduct of discussion groups, engagement in study or research;
12 [Vol. 11:1
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inurement restriction." In addition, the requirements for the charitable
deduction remain linked to the requirements for charitable exemption, i.e.,
the law does not require separate tests for two rather different tax benefits.
Further, charitable status remains, for all intents and purposes, an either/or
proposition. Revocation of exemption, which is based on an inquiry into all
the facts and circumstances, remains the primary sanction for failure to meet
a condition of charitable status.3 9
personal service organizations that provide an educational benefit to the public (e.g.,
instruction on money management, instruction on a method of painless childbirth);
personal counseling organizations (group counseling to widows and widowers,
marriage counseling, counseling to immigrants); instruction for civic betterment
(e.g., dissemination of information on the need for international cooperation); study
and research organizations (e.g., "[t]he variety . .. is nearly limitless"); organizations
that publish educational material; organizations engaged in scientific research;
churches; other religious organizations; cruelty prevention organizations; amateur
sports organizations; literary organizations, to name a few. See also JCT Historical
Development, supra note 5, at 64, 73-81. The National Center for Charitable
Statistics at the Urban Institute maintains an elaborate and informative coding
scheme for charitable organizations, from A to Z, available at
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/nonprofit-overview-
sumRpt.php?v=ntee&t=pc&-0.
37. To suggest that the core requirements have not changed is not to imply
that there are no differences in application, or that specific standards have not arisen
for particular types of organizations. Of course they have. The point is that the
statutory language remains much as it was, and notwithstanding that standards have
arisen for many types of charities, hospitals being perhaps the most prominent
example, the statutory language over time has come to encompass an ever-expanding
range of organization much broader than that originally included within the ambit of
the charitable tax preference.
38. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
39. There are of course exceptions. The private inurement restriction can be
enforced by an excise tax on the person who benefits from the inurement (and on the
manager of the charity) instead of by loss of charitable status. In the case of public
charities, the excise tax, known as intermediate sanctions, is provided by IRC §
4958. The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 13 11(a), 110 Stat.
1452. In the case of private foundations, the excise tax is on "self-dealing" and is
provided by IRC § 4941. The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §
101(b), 83 Stat. 487. The public charity-related intermediate sanctions cover any
case of private inurement where an excess benefit is provided in a transaction by the
charity to one of its insiders. Additional intermediate sanctions are available with
respect to private foundations. Excess lobbying results in an excise tax and not in
loss of charitable status if the charity makes an election into a separate lobbying
statutory regime and the excess lobbying is within certain limits. IRC §§ 4911,
501(h)(1). And, arguably, expenditures for political campaign activity may be
subject to an excise tax and not to loss of exemption. IRC § 4955. This is arguable
because as a general matter, the excise tax on political campaign expenditures is not
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Thinking, broadly, about what has changed and what has stayed the
same, a number of observations can be made. First, the historical trend is
toward more restrictions on the charitable designation. What began in 1913
as a fairly innocent and sweeping tax exemption, devoid of detail or
conditions, has been incrementally pared back and subjected to more rules
and requirements. Charities must apply for the charitable designation, may
not engage in certain activities, and must pay tax with respect to some
income, and some charities will be treated better than others.
Second, the form these restrictions generally have taken has been
negative rather than positive. Positive requirements are the things a charity
must do to secure and keep charitable status. By contrast, negative
requirements are the things a charity must refrain from doing. The tax
preference of 1913 was very simple, with essentially one negative
requirement and one positive requirement. The negative requirement was the
sensible but general proscription against private inurement.40 The positive
requirement was that the organization be organized and operated for a good
purpose.4 1 Although the charitable designation has been narrowed
considerably over time, limits have come via new negative restrictions. That
is, charity has been asked to refrain from doing certain things, such as
politicking or lobbying, or engaging in (untaxed) business activity. But
charity has not, in general, been asked to do anything affirmative, apart from
file forms.42 Thus, the century's narrowing of the charitable designation has
an intermediate sanction but applies in addition to revocation of charitable status.
"The adoption of the excise tax sanction does not modify the present-law rule that an
organization does not qualify for tax-exempt status as a charitable organization, and
is not eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions, unless the organization does
not participate in, or intervene in, any political campaign on behalf of or in
opposition to any candidate for public office." H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, at 1623-24
(1987). As a practical matter, however, the IRS has imposed the § 4955 excise tax
without revoking tax-exempt status. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Grasping Smoke:
Enforcing the Ban on Political Activity by Charities, 6 First Amend. L. Rev. 1
(2007).
40. The private inurement restriction in a sense is both a positive and a
negative requirement: it is positive in that it in effect requires that a charity organize
as a nonprofit; and it is negative in that a charity must not allow its assets to be used
for the benefit of organization insiders.
41. As a positive requirement, however, this was hardly rigorous. It was
more descriptive of a Good Purpose Organization (we know it when we see it), an
assumption, than a requirement really to do anything.
42. The principal exception to this is imposition of a pay out requirement on
private foundations. IRC § 4942. One reason for the relative preference of negative
over positive restrictions may be due to the nature of each. Negative restrictions
often are reactive and impose only indirect restraints on conduct making them
somewhat easier fodder for the legislative process. For example, a charity steps into
an arena, say political activity, by endorsing a candidate for public office. The
14 [Vol. 11:1
Charity in the 21st Century
occurred not through an effort to limit eligibility for the preference or to
demand something quantifiable in return for tax benefits, but through rules
that constrain the scope of the preference once eligibility has been
established.
A third observation relates to a consequence of a century of retreat
from the scope of the original tax preference in the form of negative and not
positive restrictions: the facilitation of a large and growing charitable sector.
Without positive requirements, becoming and remaining a charity is
relatively easy.4 3 Although a charity in 2011 faces a lot more rules and
restrictions than a charity of 1913, apart from a vague entreaty to remain
"operated" for its purpose," the exemption, once granted, is unlikely to be
withdrawn.4 5 With such a pluralistic approach to the definition of charity, the
question then is presented: is this activity appropriate? Congress generates a
response in the form of a negative restriction, which provides "no, charity may not
engage in political activity." Congress, often a reactive institution, is well positioned
to address such questions and provide responses. Although the scope of "charitable"
conduct is limited by the negative restriction, charitable organizations have not been
told to engage in a particular activity, or otherwise perform an act in a certain way.
By contrast, positive requirements impose an affirmative burden, arguably are less
,reactive than negative requirements, and require a more nuanced, and so more
difficult, legislative response. Although a negative restriction imposes a burden by
limiting conduct, such restrictions are comparatively less intrusive to the
organization than a positive requirement. A positive requirement requires action,
with a failure to act resulting in an excise tax and possibly loss of charitable status.
The "action" requirement embedded within a positive restriction presents, as a
practical matter, a higher legislative threshold normatively, practically, and
politically.
43. Rob Reich, Lacey Dom & Stefanie Sutton, Stanford University Center
on Philanthropy and Civil Society, Anything Goes: Approval of Nonprofit Status by
the IRS (2009).
44. Introduction of the unrelated business income tax substantially
weakened the operational test. The statute requires that a charity be operated
"exclusively" for exempt purposes; but "exclusively" now means in regulations
"primarily." Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(1) ("An organization will be regarded as
'operated exclusively' for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily
in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in §
501(c)(3)."). Any other outcome would be wholly inconsistent with the UBIT, which
by definition applies only to business activity unrelated to exempt purposes, IRC §
512(a)(1), and which was devised to allow such activity without revocation of
charitable status.
45. According to a list maintained by the IRS, 510 organizations had their
charitable status revoked over approximately a five-year period. See Recent
Revocations of 501(c)(3) Determinations-Latest Additions and Table of Links,
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/O,,id=141466,00.html (providing a
regularly updated, list of revocations from January 1, 2005 through the present).
There is no indication of the reason for revocation, i.e., the organization might have
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term evolves to accommodate societal change and as it does so, the activities
encompassed by section 501(c)(3) grow.46 Further, because the requirements
for the charitable deduction are linked to requirements for charitable
exemption, the amount of support provided by the federal government to the
sector via the charitable designation also naturally increases 47 along with the
definition of charity.
Accordingly, notwithstanding the restrictive trend in the law, the
scope of the charitable designation has grown significantly in terms of the
number of organizations, the amount of assets and revenues, and the types of
activities. Today, the charitable designation covers over 1.1 million
organizations.48 Revenues of charitable organizations are approximately $1.4
trillion.4 9 The value of assets held by charitable organizations is
approximately $2.6 trillion.50 Comparable numbers from the mid-1970s
demonstrate the enormous recent growth of charities. In 1976, there were
259,523 charitable organizations and in 1975 (using constant 2001 dollars)
revenues were approximately $155 billion and assets were approximately
$361 billion." Thus, since the mid-seventies, the charitable sector has grown
by about 324 percent in terms of the number of organizations, 918 percent in
terms of revenues, and 786 percent in terms of assets. Entire classes of
organizations continue to be recognized-churches, hospitals, colleges and
ceased to exist, voluntarily changed its status, or been subject to audit and revocation
for violations of charitable status requirements.
46. In 1959, the Treasury Department issued new regulations defining
charity in the legal sense, which was an expansion over the previous definition of
charity in the ordinary sense, in force since 1913. See JCT Historical Development,
supra note 6, at 61.
47. The five-year (2009-2013) tax expenditure for the charitable tax
deduction is estimated to be $237.6 billion. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation,
Il 1th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2009-2013, at
39, 41, 42 (Joint Comm. Print 2010) (combining 32.4 billion for education, 184.1
billion for social services, and 21.1 billion for health).
48. Molly F. Sherlock & Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., R40919,
An Overview of the Nonprofit and Charitable Sector 3 (2009). This figure does not
include organizations that do not file an exemption application with the IRS, which
could number in the hundreds of thousands (e.g., churches, other qualifying religious
organizations, and very small organizations). Approximately 116,000 of the 1.5
million organizations are private foundations. Id.
49. Id. at 9-12 (reporting as of July 2009). Again, this does not include
organizations that do not report to the IRS on the annual information return (Form
990 series) such as churches and small organizations. Of this amount, $181 billion is
revenue of private foundations. Id. at 12.
50. Id. at 11-12 (reporting as of July 2009, not including non-filing
organizations). Of this amount $621 billion is held by private foundations. Id. at 12.
51. See JCT Historical Development, supra note 5, at 20, 24.
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universities-though such organizations look much different today than 100
years ago.
A fourth observation relates to enforcement. Significant growth has
not been accompanied by strong enforcement. Indeed, audit activity is
negligible. For the 2007-2008 filing year, the IRS received 888,412
information returns.52 To review all of these returns, the IRS assigned 461
employees, with the result that 2,946 returns were examined, for an audit
rate of returns of about one-third of one percent. Thus, the risk of audit for a
charitable organization is extremely low.
Regardless, even if there were a dramatic increase in resources and a
corresponding uptick in audits and examinations, there likely would be little
meaningful change in growth or in the nature of organizations qualifying for
charitable status. This is because, with respect to public charities, there is, in
truth, very little "hard" law for the IRS to enforce. In general, to enforce the
charitable status designation, the IRS is limited to an inquiry into
"purpose,"5 with the thrust of the inquiry being not on the substance of the
purpose, or the direct accomplishments of the organization, but on the more
ethereal inquiry into whether the organization really is benefiting private
interests more than public ones, i.e., "is the organization generally operated
more for private than public benefit?" Importantly, this existential question is
the heart of the matter primarily because of the all-or-nothing, facts and
circumstances nature of enforcement. The principal sanction available to the
IRS is revocation of charitable status, and to a certain extent, this sanction
drives the either/or inquiry. An organization either qualifies as a charity or it
does not, there is no middle ground. And there also is no bright line test.
Further, because the sanction is severe, an already delicate query is to a
certain extent tilted in favor of the organization. Revocation of the charitable
designation is a serious step, and, as a practical matter, is not undertaken
lightly."
A final related observation, occupying the balance of this paper, is
that the consequences of regulation by negative restriction and the relative
absence of bright enforcement lines are beginning to stress the viability of
the regulatory system and the charitable designation. The all-or-nothing
52. IRS Data Book, 2008, Publ'n 55B, at 33, tbl.13 (2009).
53. Id. The number of returns examined does not equate with the number of
organizations examined because some organizations examined file multiple returns.
54. Where there are bright lines to enforce, for example, excise taxes for
excess lobbying, the inquiry can be more focused on a less existential issue.
55. This in part explains the recent IRS governance initiative. See supra
note 13. The dearth of enforcement tools and positive requirements leaves the IRS
with little leverage over charitable organizations. To the extent good governance can
be linked to "tax compliance," which in this case should mean operating for
charitable purposes, making governance a priority of enforcement and education is a
tool the IRS is using to promote more charitable outcomes.
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nature of the tax preference combined with the vague positive requirement to
be operated for charitable purposes and no other meaningful positive
requirement, has limited the ability of the IRS, for better or for worse,
effectively to police abuse or to check the growth of the charitable sector in
any meaningful way or even to provide any strong degree of confidence that
the organizations receiving the public charity designation, typically at the
outset of their existence, met their promises or are actually serving a public
benefit. The outcome is a large and growing charitable sector, legal standards
that accommodate growth, and a weak enforcement presence.
This is a recipe for problems, problems that are revealing themselves
in different ways. One manifestation is through the deluge of recently
reported scandals and the resulting reform legislation. As described in the
next Part of this Article (Part III), the wide ranging nature of the reported
scandals left a deep impression that something was not quite right in the
charitable sector, and that legislation was required. Another manifestation is
evidenced by the subtext of the reform legislation. As discussed in Part IV
of this Article, the legislation signals weaknesses in the current regulatory
approach, namely the breadth of the charitable designation, the basis for
distinguishing among charitable organizations, and the facts and
circumstances-based approach to enforcement.
PART III. SCANDALS AS SYMPTOMS OF A NEED FOR REFORM
A. Overview
In the initial decade of the twenty-first century, there were two broad
legislative themes respecting charitable organizations. The first was to
encourage private philanthropy through new charitable giving incentives.
The second, and slower to develop theme, was reform of the rules relating to
charitable organizations. The century began with the election of President
George W. Bush who had made the "faith-based initiative" a part of his
campaign. The idea was to allow direct federal funding of religious
institutions irrespective of hiring practices, proselytizing, or religious-based
discrimination.56 Related to it was a federal income tax deduction for
charitable contributions by taxpayers who take the standard deduction: the
so-called "non-itemizer" deduction. Upon election, the President submitted
these two proposals, and a handful of other charitable giving incentives to the
56. White House, Rallying the Armies of Compassion (2001), available at
http://archives.hud.gov/reports/rally.pdf.
57. Id. Taxpayers who take the standard deduction are not allowed to claim
itemized deductions, including the charitable contribution deduction. IRC § 63(b).
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107th Congress as part of the Fiscal Year 2001 budget.58 Although there was
an initial push to pass the charitable giving legislation, it stalled, perhaps
because of the controversy connected with the faith-based initiative.
Accordingly, between 2001 and 2003 (covering the 107th and 108th
Congresses) there were four markups and three floor votes, but no law.
Meanwhile, as the legislative process on the faith-based initiative
and charitable giving incentives took its lumbering course, the second theme
took hold. Between the fall of 2001 and the summer of 2004, scandal spread
across the charitable sector, sullying the names of many leading charities and
industries. Brand name charities that were associated with a scandal or
questionable practice included the United Way, the Nature Conservancy, the
American Red Cross, the Smithsonian Institution, and American University,
to name some of the more prominent. Entire swathes of the charitable sector
also were tarnished: nonprofit hospitals as a class came under fire,
organizations formed to provide credit counseling were investigated, and
private foundations were criticized, as were other grant-making charities
known as donor advised funds and supporting organizations. Particular
issues also repeatedly arose involving charities: valuation and other abuses
relating to charitable contributions of noncash property, the participation of
charities in tax-shelter transactions, and the questionable use of charities by
Members of Congress, among others.
To any particular scandal, one could respond, and many did respond,
that these were just the actions of a "few bad apples" or "outliers." No doubt,
there is some truth to this. The media tends to report on the worst cases
(those that make the best news); the worst cases are by definition the
exception, and press reports rarely tell the entire story, are not legal opinions,
and are not always accurate. But, as the review of scandals below should
indicate, the range of the reported abuses and questionable conduct was too
58. White House, A Blueprint for New Beginnings: A Responsible Budget
for America's Priorities (2001), available at www.gpoacess.gov/usbudget/fy02/
pdf/blueprnt.pdf.
59. In the 108th Congress, charitable giving legislation (H.R. 7) passed the
House by a vote of 408-13 and (S. 476) the Senate by a vote of 95-5.
Notwithstanding the lopsided support in both House and Senate, however, conferees
were never appointed and the legislation lapsed. See generally Staff of Joint Comm.
on Taxation,107th Cong., Description of an Amendment in the Nature of a
Substitute to H.R. 7, The "Community Solutions Act Of 2001" (Joint Comm. Print
2001); Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 107th Cong., Description of the "CARE
Act of 2002" (Joint Comm. Print 2002); Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 108th
Cong., Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of S. 476, The "Care Act of
2003", As Passed by the Senate (Joint Comm. Print 2003); Staff of Joint Comm. on
Taxation, 108th Cong., Description of the Chairman's Amendment in the Nature of a




wide merely to be shrugged off by policymakers. The breadth of
organizations involved and the scope of alleged abuse pointed to underlying
problems, not just at one or another charity, but with the system of rules
itself. It is well outside the scope of this Article to discuss or cite every
reported questionable practice or tarnished charity of the past several years.
Rather the point of the following survey is to highlight and emphasize the
far-reaching nature of issues that were raised. Scandal is relevant, apart from
the merits, because of the reputational damage to charity, and perhaps more
importantly, because the scandals, and the legislative solutions they
prompted, suggest that our current system of rules and oversight is not
sufficient.
B. Some Specifics of Some of the Scandals
1. Scandals at Certain Iconic Charitable Institutions
Scandals at iconic charitable institutions often drive perceptions
about the charitable sector as a whole-in the eyes of the public and
policymakers. The development of the reform theme was to a certain extent
driven by early scandals at such organizations, including the United Way, the
American Red Cross, and the Nature Conservancy.
(i) The United Way
Early in the decade, the United Way was widely criticized for
questionable accounting of donor funds. An article in the New York Times
began: "Some United Way organizations, trying to appear more successful
and more efficient with their donors' money, are counting contributions in
ways that make the numbers look more robust-and expenses look
smaller."60 The article went on to describe United Way guidelines that
allowed double counting of contributions in order to make the United Way
appear to have more public support than it had. The practice, and the fallout,
followed the devastating frauds at Enron and Worldcom, and hinted that
cooking the books was not necessarily isolated to for-profit enterprises.
United Way, an iconic charity if ever there was one, found itself compared to
two of the most reviled organizations of the decade.
(ii) The American Red Cross
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Red Cross mounted a
9/11-related fundraising campaign, and raised hundreds of millions of
60. Stephanie Strom, Questions Arise on Accounting at United Way, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 2002, at Al.
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dollars. However, the money raised greatly exceeded the amount the Red
Cross believed was needed to help those harmed by the attacks. So the Red
Cross announced that it would instead use some of the money for other
charitable purposes. This decision, fairly or not, sparked outrage in the media
and on Capitol Hill, resulting in hearings and tough questioning of (and
eventual change in) the leadership of the Red Cross.6 ' At the time, it was an
isolated incident involving a brand-name charity. But the fallout was
considerable, and contributed to an erosion of confidence in charities, later
reinforced by continuing press reports of scandals in the sector.62
(iii) The Nature Conservancy
In May 2003, the Washington Post ran a series of front-page articles
questioning practices at The Nature Conservancy (TNC), a leading
63 arienvironmental organization. The articles (and the ensuing investigation
launched by the Senate Finance Committee staff) directly or indirectly raised
a number of issues relating to organization size, mission, and governance. It
came as a shock to some to learn how big and complex a charity could
become. A trusted name for environmental issues, TNC grew from a small
61. See Grant Williams, Turmoil at the Red Cross, The Chronicle of
Philanthropy, Nov. 1, 2001, at 72 ("Critics charge that Red Cross headquarters has
been intentionally fuzzy in describing how money donated after the recent terrorism
attacks would be spent on victims."); Ian Wilhelm, Red Cross Plans to Spend All
Donations to Help September 11 Attack Victims, The Chronicle of Philanthropy,
Nov. 29, 2001, at 30 ("After enduring weeks of criticism, the American Red Cross
appears to have assuaged the concerns of government officials and donors by
declaring that it will spend all the money it collected after September 11 solely to
help the victims of the terrorist attacks."); Response by Charitable Organizations to
the Recent Terrorist Attacks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H.
Comm. on Ways & Means, 107th Cong. (2001).
62. See Stephen G. Greene, In Disaster's Wake, The Chronicle of
Philanthropy, Sept. 5, 2002, at 4 (quoting Paul C. Light, director of the Center for
Public Service at the Brookings Institution, "I think the sector has been damaged by
the aftermath of September 11, and it will take more than denial to address the
erosion of public support," and noting that by May 2002, the number of Americans
expressing lots of confidence in charities had fallen to 18 percent from 25 percent
the summer before).
63. David B. Ottaway & Joe Stephens, Nonprofit Land Bank Amasses
Billions: Charity Builds Assets on Corporate Partnerships, Wash. Post, May 4, 2003,
at A01; Joe Stephens & David Ottaway, How a Bid to Save a Species Came to Grief,
Wash. Post, May 5, 2003, at A01; Joe Stephens & David Ottaway, Nonprofit Sells
Scenic Acreage to Allies at a Loss, Wash. Post, May 6, 2003, at AO1; David Ottaway
& Joe Stephens, Landing a Big One: Preservation, Private Development, Wash. Post,
May 6, 2003, at A09; Joe Stephens & David Ottaway, Developers Find Payoff in
Preservation, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 2003, at AO1.
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group of scientists who formed the "Ecologist's Union" in 1946 to a
significant corporate enterprise operating in all 50 States and over 30
countries.6" In TNC's fiscal year 2002, the year before the Washington Post
profile, TNC reported assets of $2.93 billion, annual revenues of $972.4
million, and expenses of $632.5 million.65 Size and growth often are signs of
success and strength, and not a reason to criticize. But size can also breed
mistrust, misunderstanding, and comparison to other large, often for-profit,
organizations. And with size may come questionable decisions. To what
extent did the facilitation of oil drilling in a bird refuge advance the mission
of TNC? Were partnerships with General Electric to sell pollution credits
manifestly the best way to protect the environment? Were corporate
sponsorship agreements with cereal companies to sell granola bars in direct
furtherance of environmental purposes? TNC later said that some of its
transactions were ill-advised, and related in part to the unstructured growth
of the organization. 6 One explanation was a lapse in good governance
practices. Large boards and the potential conflicts of interest presented by
appointing to the Board senior representatives from the oil and other
industries, which, some would say, operate in contravention to TNC's stated
mission, were highlighted. As a result, TNC hired outside consultants to
recommend changes to its governing structure, changes later adopted.
Additional questions were raised about insider dealing, charitable
contributions, and other issues.6 8 At the end of the day, TNC voluntarily
undertook many changes to internal governance, cut back or cancelled
certain programs, and claimed to be a much better organization as a result of
61the intense scrutiny.
64. See The Nature Conservancy, http://www.nature.org/ (visit pages
"About Us" and "Where We Work"); Staff of S. Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong., 1
Rep. of Staff Investigation of The Nature Conservancy, Exec. Summary 3-5 (Comm.
Print 2005).
65. Staff of S. Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong., 1 Rep. of Staff Investigation of
The Nature Conservancy, Exec. Summary 5 (Comm. Print 2005).
66. Joe Stephens & David Ottaway, Nature Conservancy Suspends Land
Sales: Board of Nonprofit to Review Practices, Wash. Post, May 13, 2003, at A03;
Joe Stephens & David Ottaway, Conservancy Abandons Disputed Practices: Land
Deals, Loans Were Questioned, Wash. Post, June 14, 2003, at A01.
67. Press Release, The Nature Conservancy, Release of Senate Finance
Committee Staff Report, 2005 Tax Notes Today 110-14 (June 7, 2005), available at
www.nature.org/pressroom/press/pressl955.html.
68. See generally Staff of S. Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong., Rep. of Staff
Investigation of The Nature Conservancy (Comm. Print 2005).
69. Edited Transcript of the Sept. 16, 2005 Meeting of the Am. Bar Ass'n
Sec. of Taxation's Exempt Organizations Comm., Statement of Philip Tabas,
General Counsel of the Nature Conservancy, 2005 Tax Notes Today 219-35 (Sept.
16, 2005) ("[A]s a result of [the Washington Post] articles, the Senate Finance
Committee launched an investigation into The Nature Conservancy and the IRS
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2. Contributions ofNoncash Property
Scandals relating to contributions of noncash property to charitable
organizations raised a number of issues, which fit broadly into two
categories: valuation-based scandals, in which charities are used (passively
or not) to facilitate unwarranted tax deductions through overvaluation claims;
and churning, in which charities are in effect used as conduits for sales or
other transactions that generate deductions for donors and revenue for third
parties and the charities involved. Public charities that were implicated were
diverse; private foundations, however, were largely unaffected because of the
different tax rules that apply.
Abuse associated with the charitable deduction is in part a result of
the general rule that allows a federal income tax deduction for charitable
contributions to public charities equal to the fair market value of property
contributed. Under such a rule, in any case in which the value of the property
is overstated, intentionally or not, the federal government is cheated. For
example, if property is worth $1,000, but a taxpayer (say in a 35 percent
marginal tax bracket) overstates the value by 10 percent (claiming the
property is worth $1,100), the taxpayer gets a deduction of $385 instead of
$350. Will the IRS target the excess deduction of $35? Probably not.7 0 Will
the IRS pursue a 10 percent overvaluation of significantly more magnitude,
resulting in an excess deduction of $35,000 (actual value $1,000,000 and
claimed value of $1,100,000)? Possibly, but consider the costs to the IRS of
proceeding and the many uncertainties of prevailing, especially given the
imprecise nature of valuation and that taxpayers can and do support their
claims with appraisals. In short, the valuation-based deduction for
contributions of noncash property is an administrative headache, an
opportunity for abuse, and thus also for scandal."
began to conduct an audit of our practices. I am pleased to report that in both cases
we have concluded those investigations successfully, and I think the Conservancy is
a better organization for having gone through it, although it was painful, to say the
least, while we were involved in those.").
70. And the loss to the Treasury is not huge. It would take one million of
such taxpayers to reach a loss of $35 million, which though a large number, is not a
lot of money in the context of a $2 trillion budget. That said, this sort of "gap"
between taxes owed and taxes paid is the subject of ongoing concern. See, e.g., IRS,
Reducing the Federal Tax Gap: A Report on Improving Voluntary Compliance
(2007); IRS, Update on Reducing the Federal Tax Gap and Improving Voluntary
Compliance (2009).
71. See, e.g., Charities and Charitable Giving - Proposals for Reform:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong., 166 (2005) (written statement of
Mark Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue) ("I have read with much interest
the Joint Committee on Taxation's description of problems in the area of clothing,
household items, and other contributions of property and I agree that these are
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Perhaps the highest profile of the valuation-based scandals involved
contributions of easements to charity for environmental purposes.72 Although
numerous issues arose involving easement contributions,7 3 the principal one
concerned "fagade easements," wherein a homeowner would contribute to a
local charity an easement that restricted the homeowner from making
changes to the fagade of his house. Homeowners might claim that the
easement was worth at least 10 percent of the value of the home, not an
insignificant amount, especially during a time of rapidly escalating home
resource-intensive for us to audit. Overvaluations are difficult to identify,
substantiate, and litigate. Further, donors and the recipient charities do not have
adverse interests that would help establish a correct valuation."). Others argue there
is little policy rationale for allowing a deduction for the appreciation in contributions
of capital gain property. See Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of
Appreciated Property and the Realization of Built-In Gains, 56 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2002).
72. An easement typically is a partial interest in property (i.e., the easement
represents but part of the property interest of the holder with respect to the
underlying property). Although the general tax rule is that no charitable contribution
deduction is allowed for contributions of partial interests of property, there is an
exception for conservation easements or "qualified conservation contributions,"
which are, in brief, contributions of partial property interests exclusively for
conservation purposes. IRC § § 170(f)(3), 170(h). As with The Nature Conservancy,
scandals relating to conservation easements also were publicized by the Washington
Post. Joe Stephens, For Owners of Upscale Homes, Loophole Pays; Pledging to
Retain the Facade Affords a Charitable Deduction, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 2004, at
A01; Joe Stephens, Tax Break Turns Into Big Business, Wash. Post, Dec. 13, 2004,
at A01; Joe Stephens, Group Ends Pitches for Home Easements; Criticism of Tax
Deductions Leads National Architectural Trust to Halt Practice, Wash. Post, Jan. 12,
2005, at A08 ("The National Architectural Trust, the country's fastest-growing
historic preservation organization, has stopped soliciting facade easement donations
after complaints that homeowners have used the donations to claim millions of
dollars in excessive income tax deductions.").
73. Turner v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 299 (2006) (property acquired
adjacent to Mt. Vernon subject to floodplain restrictions on development but
developer erroneously claimed a $342,781 conservation easement charitable
deduction arguing that easement also restricted the development); Glass v.
Commissioner 124 T.C. 258, aff'd 471 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2006) (taxpayer claimed a
charitable deduction for the contribution of two small, non-contiguous conservation
easements in separate tax years on the same parcel of land with little or no
discernable public benefit and without encumbering the retained property for
development purposes); Dep't of Treasury, General Explanations of the
Administration's Fiscal Year 2006 Revenue Proposals 112 (explaining proposed
penalties on charities that fail to enforce conservation easements) (2005); Steven
Small, Proper - and Improper - Deductions for Conservation Easement Donations,
Including Developer Donations, 2004 Tax Notes Today 198-44 (Oct. 11, 2004). See
also Joe Stephens & David Ottaway, Developers Find Payoff in Preservation, Wash.
Post, Dec. 21, 2003, at AO1.
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prices.74 But there were reasons to question many valuations, especially
considering that often, the homeowner resided in a historic district and
therefore already was prohibited by local law from making changes to the
fagade of the home. This manifestly made assertions of high values for
fagade easements questionable and converted a run-of-the-mill valuation
problem into an eye-grabbing scandal (involving Members of Congress no
less). It was made worse by the fact that some charities appeared to have
been formed exclusively to facilitate easement donations in historic districts
and actively promoted them.76
Other valuation-related scandals included contributions of
intellectual property (corporate donors claiming valuations of patents in the
millions of dollars);" clothing and household items (hard to verify value of
used clothing); 78 taxidermy (taxpayers either overvalue the property or
74. See e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 200738013 (Aug. 9, 2007) ("Some
taxpayers claim reliance upon a Market Segment Specialization Program Guide
(Guide) and also upon a Topical Tax Brief, which were posted on the IRS website.
These documents at one time suggested a range within which a facade easement
might be expected to reduce the value of property. However, they also described the
'before and after' method as the proper method by which to value a facade easement,
making it clear that a full analysis of the value of the property both before and after
the donation was necessary. The Guide expressly stated that its material was
designed specifically for training purposes and could not be used or cited as
authority for a technical position. Nevertheless, this language was removed from the
Guide and the Topical Tax Brief years ago and does not support an otherwise
insufficient valuation."); Hillborn v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 677 (1985) (applying
the "before and after" valuation approach and upholding a valuation at 12 percent of
the property determined before the easement contribution); Griffin v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo 1989-130 (1989) (upholding a value of 20 percent of the underlying
property).
75. Joe Stephens, For Owners of Upscale Homes, Loophole Pays; Pledging
to Retain the Facade Affords a Charitable Deduction, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 2004, at
A01.
76. Joe Stephens, Senators Vow to End Tax Break on Easements; Wealthy
Homeowners Have Taken Advantage, Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 2004, at A03; see supra
notes 74-75.
77. Stephanie Strom, IRS Focuses on Noncash Donations to Charities, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 24, 2003, at A18 (quoting IRS Commissioner Mark Everson, ("We're
seeing an increasing number of donations [of patents] that don't pass the smell
test.").
78. See Tom Herman, Tax Report: Software for Preparing Taxes is Getting
Better-Top Sellers Offer More Tips and Clearer Instructions; Free Advice on Web
Sites, Wall Street J., Feb. 23, 2005, at D2 ("[H]ere is a tip for many people who
itemize and donate bulging bags of old clothing and other items to charity: Consider
buying 'Its Deductible'. . . . Many people who give away household items don't
know how to value them. . . . This program values thousands of items based on
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include as part of their donation the costs of killing the animal; taxidermy
stored in trailers and not accessible to the public);7 9 and art (taxpayers donate
a percentage of a valuable painting to a museum without any transfer of
possession).so Problems with valuation led the staff of the Joint Committee
on Taxation to propose eliminating the deduction for contributions of
noncash property in some cases,8 ' and the Commissioner of the IRS to
highlight the administrative difficulties associated with such contributions. 82
In addition to valuation abuse, the existence of the fair market value
deduction for contributions of noncash property presents abuse opportunities
that do not depend on (though may be enhanced by) overvaluation. This is so
especially with respect to property that is not, and was never intended to be,
used for charitable purposes. In such churning-type transactions, the charity
is not the end user of the property, but rather a conduit for property that goes
from the donor to someone other than the charity, briefly "resting" with the
charity to secure a charitable contribution deduction.
The most pertinent illustration is in the contribution of vehicles to
charity. Many well-known charities advertised (and still do advertise) their
"car donation" programs.84 The basics of the transaction are that a charity
and a for-profit organization enter into an agreement whereby the charity
agrees to solicit contributions of vehicles, and the for-profit organization
agrees to pick up and then sell the vehicle. For its role in the transaction, the
charity receives a percentage of the proceeds from the sale. Although this
whether they are in good, fair or poor condition."); Guy Trebay, Old Clothing Never
Dies, It Just Fades Far, Far Away, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 2000, at B10.
79. Marc Kaufman, Big-Game Hunting Brings Big Tax Breaks; Trophy
Donations Raise Questions in Congress, Wash. Post, April 5, 2005, at AO1.
80. Rachel Emma Silverman, Wealth Manager: Joint Custody For Your
Monet-'Fractional Giving' Hits the Art World, as Donors Share Works With
Museums, Wall Street J., July 6, 2005, at DI.
81. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Options to Improve
Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures, Part VIII (Joint Comm. Print 2005).
The author served as Legislation Counsel to the Joint Committee on Taxation at the
time, with chief responsibility for exempt organization issues, and directed the
exempt organizations portion of the report.
82. See supra note 71.
83. This is not to suggest that any such conduit arrangement is abusive.
Many are not: the typical charity auction for example. What makes a charity auction
different (and a good fundraiser for charity) is that charities generally receive more
than the product is worth-and absence of middlemen improves the bottom line.
84. A "Google" search of "donate car to charity" will yield more than one
million "hits."
85. See Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-04-73, Rep. to S. Comm. On Fin.,
Vehicle Donations: Benefits to Charities and Donors, but Limited Program
Oversight (2003). The GAO noted that some charities operate their vehicle donation
programs in-house and do not rely on third party agents. Such in-house programs,
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may sound like harmless fundraising, there can be a considerable cost to
taxpayers. Take a hypothetical case: a used car worth $500 is donated to
charity, sold for $500, and the donor (in the 35 percent bracket) claims a
$500 deduction. The agreement between the charity and the for-profit
organization lets the charity keep 50 percent of the sales proceeds. The
charity gets $250, the for-profit organization gets $250 (some portion of
which may be taxable after taking expenses into account), and the federal
government loses $175 in tax revenue. As long as the amount forgone by the
government is less than the amount received by the charity (plus any tax on
the proceeds received by the for-profit), the transaction does not appear to
raise special concerns. But the tipping point comes (or should come) at about
the juncture when the charity receives less than the government loses. As
documented by the Government Accountability Office, in one egregious
case, a 1983 GMC Jimmy truck was donated to charity in 2001 and sold at
auction for $375. Net proceeds from the sale were $62 (after taking into
account third-party and advertising costs), and were split 50/50. The taxpayer
claimed a $2,400 deduction, based on a fair market value published in a used
car guidebook. Net result: $31 to charity at a cost of $840 to the
government (assuming a 35 percent bracket taxpayer). Further, the
propensity of such transactions for valuation abuses and sales at firesale
prices greatly increases the potential revenue loss to the government and
decreases the amount received by the charity.
This type of scheme can seriously damage public perception of
charity because unlike a valuation abuse where perhaps only the donor is
complicit, in a conduit-type scheme, the charity is leveraging its tax-exempt
status for the sake of a few extra dollars, and at a cost (revenue lost to the
government) ultimately borne by all taxpayers. That said, charity writ large
also can be tarnished in a more straightforward case of valuation abuse when
circumstances indicate that the charity knows or should know that a donor
may be claiming an excess valuation88 or when the charity accepts property
on the condition or with the expectation that the property later be sold.
though perhaps improving the bottom line to the charity, raise appearance issues:
Why is a charity running a used car selling business?
86. Id. at 15-16.
87. See Rachel Jacobson, The Car Donation Program: Regulating Charities
and For-Profits, 2004 Tax Notes Today 168-55 (Aug. 2004) (discussing car donation
programs and noting that fraudulent overvaluation of contributions to charity not
only erodes the tax base but "brings the integrity of the charity into question.").
88. One prominent example involved the donation of 4 Stradivarius violins
to the Smithsonian with the taxpayer claiming a $50 million deduction. See
Jacqueline Trescott, Smithsonian Benefactor Arrested in Germany, Wash. Post, June
18, 2004, at CO1 (noting that Smithsonian director Lawrence Small said that the
Smithsonian does not perform independent appraisals of gifts and that the




The tax shelter industry appeared to run rampant in the late 1990s,
prompting a government effort to protect the tax base.89 One result of the
increased scrutiny of the tax shelter industry came to many as a surprise:
charities commonly were participants in tax shelters. A tax shelter involving
a charity (or other tax-exempt organization) typically involves a taxpayer
trading (with cash or property) with a tax-indifferent party for a tax benefit.
If the tax benefit can be extracted from the tax-indifferent party at less cost
than the value of the benefit, both parties are better off (and the government
is worse off).
Perhaps the best-known example was the so-called SC2 transaction.
The transaction involved a charity and a corporation organized under
subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code (S Corporation). S Corporations
are not subject to an entity level tax (as are "C" Corporations); rather the
income of the corporation flows through to the corporate owners, the
shareholders. Under SC2, in order to defer income tax, shareholders of the S
Corporation directed that S Corporation nonvoting stock (which was issued
for purposes of the transaction) be contributed to a charity. The value of the
contribution (relatively low) not only flowed through to the S Corporation
shareholders as a deduction, but more importantly, income attributable to the
contributed stock escaped taxation because it was "allocated" but not
distributed to a tax-exempt charity. The income, however, remained under
the control of and could be reinvested by the S Corporation. Later, pursuant
to a redemption agreement, the S Corporation repurchased the nonvoting
stock (this was the charity's "profit" for its role in the transaction) and when
the income was subsequently distributed to the S Corporation shareholders,
the shareholders were advised (in opinion letters by accounting firm KPMG)
that they could claim that the income was capital gain income not ordinary
million in 1986, $20 million the next year, $30 million two months later, and in 1997
at the time of the actual gift, $55 million, based on the value asserted by the
taxpayer).
89. See Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Staff of S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong., The Role of Professional
Firms in the U.S. Tax Shelter Industry (Comm. Print 2005). See also, e.g., Cassell
Bryan-Low, KPMG Didn't Register Strategy - Former Partner's Memo Says Fees
Reaped From Sales of Tax Shelter Far Outweigh Potential Penalties, Wall Street J.,
Nov. 17, 2003, at Cl ("It was during the late 1990s that sales of tax shelters boomed
as large accounting firms like KPMG and other advisers stepped up their marketing
efforts."); David Cay Johnston, Crackdown on Tax Cheats Not Working, Panel Says,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 2003, at C2 (noting that witnesses before a Senate Finance
Committee hearing would conclude that notwithstanding the efforts of the IRS, tax
cheating continues "unabated" and is estimated to cost the government $14 to $18
billion a year (in 2000), if not substantially more).
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income and thus subject to a lower tax rate. In short, through a sham
transaction, the S Corporation shareholders were told they could defer
taxation of income (a valuable tax benefit in itself) and then, when tax
eventually was owed, pay at a reduced rate.90
The Commissioner of the IRS testified to the Senate Finance
Committee in 2005 that: "Of the 31 categories of listed [i.e., suspected]
transactions, nearly half may involve tax-indifferent parties either as
accommodation parties or as active participants."" This raised the obvious
question of why any charitable organization (or other tax-indifferent party)
would facilitate tax avoidance.
4. Private Foundations
A reader of the Boston Globe's "Spotlight" series on private
foundations that ran in the fall of 2003 likely would leap to the conclusion
that something was rotten in the foundation world.92 The poster-child for the
90. See Minority Staff of Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S.
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong., No. 108-34, U.S. Tax Shelter
Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals, Appendix
B: Case Study of S-Corporation Charitable Contribution Strategy (SC2) (Comm.
Print 2003). The IRS effectively shut down the SC2 transaction via Notice 2004-30,
2004-1 C.B. 828.
91. Charities and Charitable Giving: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Fin.,
supra note 71, at 162, (written statement of Mark Everson, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue). The IRS sought to identify potentially abusive tax shelter transactions and
stem their use by "listing" the transaction in an official document-in effect putting
the world on notice that the transaction was legally suspect.
92. Beth Healy, Francie Latour, Sacha Pfeiffer, Michael Rezendes & Walter
V. Robinson, Some Officers of Charities Steer Assets to Selves, Boston Globe, Oct.
9, 2003, at Al; Beth Healy, Foundation's Sale of Nonprofit Hospital a Windfall for
Administrator, Boston Globe, Oct. 9, 2003, at A42; Francie Latour, One Chance
Encounter Pays Huge Dividends, Boston Globe, Oct. 9, 2003, at A43; Michael
Rezendes & Sacha Pfeiffer, Underfunded IRS Unable to Monitor Trusts, Boston
Globe, Oct. 9, 2003, at A43; Beth Healy, Francie Latour, Sacha Pfeiffer, Michael
Rezendes & Walter V. Robinson, Charity Money Funding Perks, Boston Globe,
Nov. 9, 2003, at Al; Francie Latour, Costly Furnishings Come at Charities'
Expense, Boston Globe, Nov. 9, 2003, at A27; Michael Rezendes & Sacha Pfeiffer,
The Trustees' Perk That Keeps on Giving, Boston Globe, Nov. 9, 2003, at A27; Beth
Healy, Francie Latour, Sacha Pfeiffer, Michael Rezendes & Walter V. Robinson,
Foundations Veer Into Business, Boston Globe, Dec. 3, 2003, at Al; Beth Healy,
Francie Latour, Sacha Pfeiffer, Michael Rezendes & Walter V. Robinson,
Foundation Lawyers Enjoy Privileged Position, Boston Globe, Dec. 17, 2003, at Al;
Beth Healy, Charity in Worcester: An Insiders' Game, Boston Globe, Dec. 17, 2003,
at B8; Walter V. Robinson, Trustees' Fees are Talk of San Antonio's Elite, Boston
Globe, Dec. 17, 2003, at B9; Beth Healy, Francie Latour, Sacha Pfeiffer, Michael
Rezendes & Walter V. Robinson, Philanthropist's Millions Enrich Family Retainers,
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series was the Paul and Virginia Cabot Charitable Trust. The son of the Trust
founder (son and founder were both named Paul Cabot), and trustee of the
Trust, paid himself a salary totaling $5,185,216 from 1998 through 2002,
while paying an average of only $400,000 each of those years to charitable
causes. Apart from his salary, Cabot used $200,000 of Trust funds to pay for
his daughter's wedding (in Boca Grande, Florida-"these things don't come
cheaply in Florida" Cabot explained to the Globe).9 3 Cabot admitted that his
salary was "probably excessive" and that the work he performed (overseeing
the foundations investments) probably could have been done by hiring
someone for $100,000 a year.94 Cabot said he needed a large salary because
"[t]he only way I can pay my taxes is to take more money out of the
[foundation]." 95 Noting that he needed after-tax income of $30,000 a month
for living expenses (plus another $10,000 a month for his wife: "She seems
to think it's not enough, like most women"), and that he had mortgages to
pay (a $1.3 million home in Needham, Massachusetts, two waterfront homes
in Boca Grande, Florida, a twenty-five acre waterfront home in North Haven,
Maine), Cabot told the Globe, without a sense of irony: "I do not squander
this money on Ferraris or 85-foot yachts ... I live a fairly modest life."96 The
Globe series uncovered similar problems at other foundations. 97 In short, the
Globe series portrayed that for many foundations charity was an
afterthought-it came after the salary, the corporate jet, the Persian rug, and
the opportunity to benefit the private business activities of insiders. All these
trappings were costs of charity, funded by tax-deductible contributions.98
Boston Globe, Dec. 21, 2003, at Al; Francie Latour & Beth Healy, How to be a
Philanthropist-or Just Look Like One, Boston Globe, Dec. 21, 2003, at A3 1; Sacha
Pfeiffer, Good as Gold: Inheriting a Trustee Seat Can Pay Rich Dividends, Boston
Globe, Dec. 21, 2003, at A31; Beth Healy, Francie Latour, Sacha Pfeiffer, Michael
Rezendes & Walter V. Robinson, Foundations' Tax Returns Left Unchecked, Boston
Globe, Dec. 29, 2003, at Al.
93. Beth Healy, Francie Latour, Sacha Pfeiffer, Michael Rezendes & Walter
V. Robinson, Some Officers of Charities Steer Assets to Selves, Boston Globe, Oct.




97. The Globe reporters found that "[t]he cost of charity is also steep at the
William T. Morris Foundation"; in 2001 the foundation "spent $2.8 million to give
away $1.8 million with the salaries of top officials rising rapidly even as the
foundation's assets diminished." Id.
98. See also Christine Ahn, Pablo Eisenberg & Channapha Khamvongsa,
The Center for Public and Nonprofit Leadership, Georgetown Public Policy Institute,
Foundation Trustee Fees: Use and Abuse (2003).
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5. Grant-Making Public Charities: Supporting Organizations and
Donor Advised Funds
The Boston Globe series on foundations resuscitated dormant
skepticism about the foundation form, raising the spotlight on two
foundation-like charities: the "supporting organization" and the "donor
advised fund."
A supporting organization is an organization established by the
Internal Revenue Code in 1969 to describe a charity that would be classified
as a private foundation but for its relationship to an established charity that is
not a private foundation (a.k.a. a "public charity"). 99 This matters because
private foundations are subject to a much stricter legal regime than public
charities-so a supporting organization designation is desirable. The
relationship of a supporting organization to a public charity is, in theory,
supposed to inoculate the supporting organization from abuses that prompted
the stricter legal regime applicable to private foundations. 00 But, apart from
this relationship, a supporting organization in general is very similar to a
private foundation: it is a fund, and it pays out money for charitable
purposes. Accordingly, if abuses occur at supporting organizations,1ot one
response is: close the loophole, abolish the category of supporting
organization.
One type of supporting organization, the "Type III supporting
organization" required only a very informal relationship with a public
charity, 102 thus fostering the creation of supporting organizations without the
99. IRC § 509(a)(3).
100. See, e.g., Quarrie v. Commissioner, 603 F.2d 1274, 1277 (7th Cir.
1979), aff'g 70 T.C. 182 (1978) ("[T]heir exposure to public scrutiny and their
dependence on public support [is believed to] keep them from the abuses to which
private foundations [are] subject.").
101. Stephanie Strom, Big Tax Break Often Bypasses Idea of Charity, N.Y.
Times, April 25, 2005, at Al (describing a supporting organization controlled by
George Kaiser that received about $1 billion but made distributions of just over $3.4
million and another controlled by Carl Icahn that received over $118 million but
made distributions of just $2.9 million to charity); Letter from Mark W. Everson,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to The Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Fin., (Mar. 30, 2005), at 5, available at http://finance.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/Letter%20from%2OEverson.pdf (describing abuses at supporting
organizations as a top compliance problem); Jonathan Weisman, HHS Secretary's
Fund Gave Little to Charity, Wash. Post, July 21, 2006, at A01 (describing a
supporting organization founded by then HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt, loans made
by the supporting organization to support family business ventures, and minimal
charitable pay outs).
102. In general, there are three types of supporting organization: a "Type I"
is similar to a parent-subsidiary relationship between the supported public charity
(parent) and the supporting organization (subsidiary); a "Type II" is similar to a
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knowledge or input of any public charity. The supported public charity
would receive a check every year but otherwise might have no knowledge or
concern about the supporting organization sending the money (i.e., the
supporting organization is just another donor). In the meantime, the
supporting organization, funded by tax deductible contributions may be
making loans to its founder, paying little to charity, or holding business
assets to keep control of a family corporation in the family (and out of the
family's estate for estate tax purposes): all practices that likely would be
subject to excise taxes if the organization were a private foundation. 0 3
The donor advised fund is another private foundationesque public
charity, but unlike a supporting organization, did not (at the time) have any
official designation in tax law. Often referred to as the "poor man's" private
foundation, a donor advised fund is, as its name suggests, a fund, established
for charitable purposes, and with respect to which a donor to the fund may
provide nonbinding advice as to the fund's investment and expenditure.
Donor advised funds take two basic forms: large funds that resemble mutual
funds'm and smaller funds housed at a "community foundation" (which
brother-sister relationship wherein the supported and supporting organizations have
overlapping Board membership; and a "Type III" wherein the supporting
organization must meet both a "responsiveness" test and an "integral part" test. See
IRC § 509(a)(3)(B)(i), 509(a)(3)(B)(ii), and 509(a)(3)(B)(iii) respectively. See also
Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(g), (h), & (i). For a description of the legal requirements
applicable to supporting organizations prior to enactment of the PPA see Staff of
Joint Comm. on Taxation, 110th Cong., General Explanation of Tax Legislation
Enacted in the 109th Congress, at 644-650 (Joint Comm. Print 2007); Jonathan
Weisman, HHS Secretary's Fund Gave Little to Charity, Wash. Post, July 21, 2006,
at A01 ("The Internal Revenue Service has said the category is rife with abuse,
designating 'supporting organizations' this year as one of its 'Dirty Dozen' top tax
scams, along with Internet identity theft and offshore banks.").
103. IRC § 4941(d)(1)(B) (defining as self-dealing the "lending of money"
between a private foundation and a disqualified person); IRC § 4942 (requiring
private foundations to pay out a percentage of assets for charitable purposes each
year); IRC § 4943 (limiting the business holdings of a private foundation). Some
supporting organizations were marketed because of the freedoms offered. See, e.g.,
Albert B. Crenshaw, Doing Good for Charities and Your Taxes, Wash. Post, Oct. 26,
2003, at F04 ("Individuals who are interested in charitable giving, especially to a
specific cause, and want to continue to exercise considerable control over where
their money goes without some of the restrictions that apply to private foundations,
can consider what is called a supporting organization.").
104. As of April, 2009, the three largest donor advised funds are the
Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund ($3.6 billion in assets under management), the Schwab
Charitable Fund ($1.7 billion in assets under management), and the Vanguard
Charitable Endowment Program ($1.6 billion in assets under management). Mike
Spector, Family Charities Shift Assets to Donor Funds, Wall Street J., April 22,
2009, at Dl.
32 [Vol. 11:1
Charity in the 21st Century
despite the name is a public charity under the tax law, and not a private
foundation, e.g., New York Community Trust). The key difference between a
donor advised fund and a private foundation is that donor advised funds
generally have many different, unrelated donors. This enables the fund to be
defined as a public charity and not a private foundation for tax purposes, and
also introduces a level of oversight between the donor and the owner of the
funds (the sponsoring charity). But like the Type III supporting organization
and the private foundation, the donor advised fund also is a fund of money
subject to the influence of its funder. And like the supporting organization,
the donor advised fund is not subject to the private foundation anti-abuse
legal regime. Accordingly, it is a magnet for potential abuse. Without proper
oversight by the charity housing the fund, donors may be able to use a donor
advised fund to pay personal expenses, compensation, and even to dilute the
meaning of charity. There was no poster-child for donor advised fund abuse;
but they had long been a subject of discussion in government and by legal
practitioners, and increasingly had become a tool of promoters trading in tax
schemes. 05
6 Hospitals
Tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals as a class has deep historical
roots, and hospitals are the largest segment of charitable organizations,
accounting for 41.25 percent of revenues and 29.13 percent of assets though
comprising just .65 percent of organizations. 106 As such a large and
important part of the sector, hospitals have long been in the spotlight, often
presenting key questions in many areas regarding, for example: the scope of
tax exemption, conflicts of interest, the provision of charitable services,
105. Letter from Mark W. Everson, supra note 101, at 5-6, available at
http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Letter%20from%20Everson.pdf (describing
abuses at donor advised funds as a top compliance problem: "We have found that
certain promoters encourage individuals to establish purported donor-advised fund
arrangements that are used for a taxpayer's personal benefit, and some of the
charities that sponsor these funds may be complicit in the abuse. The promoters
inappropriately claim that payments to these organizations are deductible. . . . Also,
they often claim that the assets transferred to the funds may grow tax free and later
be used to benefit the donor ... to reimburse them for their expenses, or to fund their
children's educations."); See e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 103, at F04 (quoting a
wealth adviser from J.P. Morgan Private Bank: "A lot of people find those extra
[private foundation] duties are more onerous than they would like and more onerous
than they expected when they got in," and so opt for a donor-advised fund. "It has to
be a real donor-advised fund ... but then you can relieve yourself from all the rules
and regulations" and still achieve your initial goals "in a much simpler fashion.").
106. Molly F. Sherlock & Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., R
40919, An Overview of the Nonprofit and Charitable Sector 10 (2009).
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participation in joint ventures with for-profit companies and other complex
structures, conversion from non-profit to for-profit status, tax-exempt
financing, and compensation practices. During the period of mounting
scandal in the charitable sector, many hospitals added fuel to the fire. One
noteworthy expos6 in the New York Times Magazine provided an account of
Michael Loncar, a poor and uninsured patient who died; his $40,000 hospital
debt kept him at home instead of seeking emergency care.'0 7 After his death,
the hospital, Advocate Christ Medical Center in Chicago, pursued the debt
by attaching his widow's (a Walmart clerk) wages.
When a faith-based hospital sues a grieving widow over
medical debt, plunging her family deeper into poverty, some part of
the health care system has clearly failed. But which part, exactly?
One answer is to blame the hospital, which is precisely what many
advocates, elected officials and academics have been doing as stories
like the Loncars' have made headlines in the last year. "To put so
much silent agony on hapless, hard-working low-income Americans,
that's just absolutely unacceptable as conduct," says Uwe Reinhardt,
the well-respected Princeton health economist. 0 8
According to the article, the hospital charged exorbitant rates, rates
at which no insured patient (or rather, no insurance company) would ever
pay and followed up with threats and harassment by a debt-collection agency
in its employ. Another hospital system, Resurrection Health Care based in
Chicago was reported to have drafted or adopted policies that aimed to deny
nonemergency care to the uninsured, and Resurrection stood accused of
pursing debts against seventy-seven indigent patients over a four-year
period.109 This was "charity" being described at its worst. Unfortunately, the
tale was not an isolated one. Class action lawsuits were mounted with respect
to the billing and debt-collection practices of hospitals regarding the
uninsured, gaining considerable media attention (if not legal success).110
States took note. Illinois revoked the property tax exemption of a prominent




110. Holbrook Mohr, Suit Alleges Lack of Charity at Nonprofit Hospitals,
Wash. Post, June 18, 2004, at E03 (reporting on suits in eight states by attorney
Richard Scruggs targeting "[s]ome of the country's largest nonprofit hospitals" and
"alleging they have distorted the extent of their charity care while using punishing
tactics to obtain payments from uninsured patients"). The suits were not successful.
See, e.g., McCoy et. al. v. E. Tex. Med. Cent. Reg'l Healthcare Sys., 388 F. Supp. 2d
760, 768 (E. D. Tex. 2005) (finding that § 501(c)(3) of the Code did not establish a
contract between the federal government and the hospital and, thus, class members
(patients) could not be third-party beneficiaries); Sabeta v. Baptist Hospital of
Miami, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1234-35 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (same).
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hospital"' and the State legislature considered a bill to require nonprofit
hospitals in Illinois to provide a measure of free care each year as a condition
of tax exemption."12
7. Credit Counseling Organizations
No less distracting to those following events were reports from a
much smaller segment of the charitable sector: credit counseling
organizations. Originally established to provide education and free
counseling to consumers about use of credit and sound financial practices," 3
the credit counseling organization of the twenty-first century had become an
opportunistic industry, resembling a for-profit service provider in all but tax
status. The educational component of many credit counseling organizations
became nominal at best; instead, an organization would encourage
consumers to sign up for debt management plans, for which the organization
received a fee and often a for-profit organization (a bank or other service
provider) would get a referral. Managers of credit counseling organizations
were paid large sums in compensation. According to one estimate, the
industry grew five-fold between 1990 and 2002 (for a total then of 1,000
organizations), and saw 810 applications for tax exemption between 2000
and 2003.114 Many believed that section 501(c)(3) status was attractive not so
much for the tax benefit (tax exemption, though not deductibility for
contributors, also might be available under another section of the Code,
section 501(c)(4)), but because section 501(c)(3) organizations also obtained
111. See Dept. of Revenue v. Provena Covenant Med. Ctr., No. 04-PT-0014
(Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://www.revenue.state.il.us/legalinformation/
hearings/pt/pt06-26.pdf (upholding revocation of Provena's property tax exemption),
aff'd, 925 N.E.2d 1131 (111. 2010). For a discussion of the Provena saga, see John D.
Colombo, The Provena Tax Exemption Case: The Demise of Community Benefit?,
2007 Tax Notes Today 30-51 (Feb. 2007).
112. See the Tax-Exempt Hospital Responsibility Act, Ill. H.B. 5000, 94th
Gen. Assemb. (2006) (generally proposing that tax-exempt hospitals (with some
exceptions) must provide uncompensated care in an amount equal to at least 8
percent of their total operating costs).
113. Rev. Rul. 69-441, 1969-2 C.B. 115 (recognizing as a § 501(c)(3)
organization an organization that (1) educates the public on personal money
management, such as budgeting, buying practices, and the sound use of consumer
credit and (2) providing individual counseling to low-income individuals and
families without charge).
114. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, Profiteering in a Non-Profit Industry: Abusive
Practices in Credit Counseling 5 (2004).
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favorable treatment under consumer protection laws (and for example
escaped jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission)."'
8. Use of Charities by Members of Congress
Many, if not most, elected public officials are motivated to run for
public office out of some desire to serve the public interest. So it is not
surprising that many charities have the support of and even are founded by
Members of Congress. But the 2000s saw a plethora of news stories about
charities being used for political purposes."' 6 The issues of concern are
several. One is that a lobbyist (or representative of a "vested interest") is
encouraged to make a contribution to a charity controlled or influenced by a
politician. The charity has on its payroll friends of the politician or members
of the politician's family. Thus, the charity in effect launders the lobbyist's
115. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Options to
Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures, Part VIII, 329 (Joint
Comm. Print 2005).
116. Paul Kane, Members Feel Very Charitable, Roll Call, Mar. 16, 2004
("At least 48 current Members of Congress have either set up charitable foundations
or had supporters establish such organizations in their names. . . . Critics of the
growing trend of Members connecting themselves to charities question whether this
is little more than another means for lobbyists and corporations to curry favor with a
lawmaker, giving large dollars to a favorite charity to enhance one's interests.");
Paul Kane, Lobbyists Help Stevens Charity, Roll Call, Mar. 11, 2004 (reporting the
christening of a foundation founded by Senator Ted Stevens, the opening event of
which was run by a 14-member steering committee, all registered lobbyists, and
which raised at least $2 million from "hundreds of supporters, including dozens of
lobbyists with business before his panel"); Damon Chappie, Delay Foundation
Exploits New Rules, Roll Call, Jan. 20, 2003 (reporting that then House Majority
Leader Tom DeLay engineered a change to House rules to permit lawmakers to
accept free travel and lodging in connection with charity events, thus permitting
travel to a golf tournament findraiser in Florida held for the benefit of the DeLay
Foundation); Philip Shenon & Stephanie Strom, DeLay Charity for Children
Financed by Corporations, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 2005, at Al6 (reporting that the
DeLay Foundation "has been underwritten by several of the nation's largest
companies and their executives, including companies that routinely lobby lawmakers
on issues before Congress"); Eliza Newlin Carney, Charitable Chicanery, Nat'l J.,
June 24, 2006 ("What do scandal-plagued politicians Duke Cunningham, Tom
DeLay, and Alan Mollohan, along with disgraced lobbyist Jack Abramoff, all have
in common? . . . the alleged abuse of so-called 'charities' for political gain.");
Editorial, Charities on the Hill, Wash. Post, Mar. 7, 2006, at Al6 (expressing
concern that a charity created by then-Senator Rick Santorum paid large salaries to
fundraisers who also helped Santorum fund his political campaigns). For a detailed
discussion of many of the issues see Jack B. Siegel, The Wild, the Innocent, and the
K Street Shuffle: The Tax System's Role in Policing Interactions Between Charities
and Politicians, 54 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 117 (2006).
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payment resulting in personal benefit to the politician from the contribution.
Another is that lobbyist contributions to charity are used to fund travel by
politicians to desirable locations, where lobbyists also are present.1 17
9. "Excess" Compensation
Compensation to a CEO or other insider is a lens through which the
charitable sector is sometimes judged. The issue strikes a populist chord, in
part because, arguably, the general public's perception of charity and what it
means to do charity is consistent, or at least not inconsistent, with penury. So
it can come as a shock for some to learn that executives or employees of
charitable organizations earn hundreds of thousands or even millions of
dollars a year, even if the amount is reasonable in legal terms or is
established pursuant to arm's length negotiations and at a "market" rate." 8
Thus, compensation is an ongoing pressure point for the charitable sector,
with one or a handful of cases able to affect opinion.
If there was a catalytic compensation-related scandal in the lead-up
to charitable reform legislation, most likely it was that involving American
University President Benjamin Ladner. The scandal began when an
anonymous letter claimed that Ladner used University money for extravagant
personal expenses. The letter led to an investigation and report by outside
counsel, which identified $500,000 in questionable expenses (including over
$200,000 for a chef). During the investigation, the reasonableness of
Ladner's $800,000 salary, the oversight of his compensation package by the
117. Charities also were used in novel ways: Representative Tom Delay and
Senator Bill Frist planned to use charities in connection with events at the 2004
Republican National Convention. John Bresnahan, Texan Starts New Charity, Roll
Call, Nov. 13, 2003 (reporting that Majority Leader Tom DeLay created a new
charity in connection with the upcoming Republican convention; a contribution of
$500,000 yields private dinners with Delay, golf tee times, a yacht cruise, concert
tickets, and access to a luxury suite during the convention); Editorial, The Hammer
Eyes Manhattan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2003, at A24 (same); Michael Slackman,
G.O.P. Leader Solicits Money for Charity Tied to Convention, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14,
2003, at Al (noting that Bill Frist appeared to follow Delay's lead).
118. In general, if a charitable organization pays unreasonable
compensation to an insider of the organization, excise taxes apply to the disqualified
person and possibly to mangers of the charity. IRC § 4958. There is generally no
sanction for unreasonable compensation paid by a public charity to someone not an
insider unless the "private benefit" doctrine can be invoked, resulting in loss of
charitable exemption. (In contrast, under § 4946, an excise tax may be imposed on a
private foundation with respect to unreasonable compensation paid to someone not
an insider or, technically, a disqualified person as defined in § 4946). For a
discussion of whether current public charity excise taxes should be extended to cover
compensation to non-insiders, see Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and
Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 735 (2007).
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Board of Trustees, and the manner of disclosure to the IRS of Ladner's
compensation were all questioned.' 19 There were similar scandals and raising
of eyebrows at "high" compensation levels at a number of charitable
organizations.12 0
C Summary
The reported scandals demonstrated a widespread abuse of the
charitable form. "Charity" is not only a word that evokes feelings of concern
toward others and thoughts of public goods, but also a label that happens to
be a valuable asset. A charity can be used in many non-charitable ways: as an
accommodating party for tax avoidance transactions, as a tool of a private
interest (including a Member of Congress), or as a way to facilitate charitable
contributions with little or no benefit to charitable beneficiaries and at real
cost to the government (and thus, to the taxpayer). The car donation
programs embraced by so many charities showed complacency about the tax
preference. Charities of course wanted money and would accept pennies
even though the cost to the government plausibly was far greater. In other
cases, charities accepted contributions with the likely knowledge that the
taxpayer was claiming a deduction in excess of the value of the asset.12 1
Worse, some charities were formed for the sole purpose of encouraging
contributions of arguably worthless assets (fagade easements) or directing
benefits to an insider (supporting organizations and donor advised funds), or
were paid for the act of participating in a transaction (SC2). Some credit
counseling organizations arguably were formed to escape regulation of
consumer protection laws. Some educational organizations were used by
119. For a discussion of the scandal, see Michael W. Peregrine & Robert C.
Louthian, American University: Significant Implications for Nonprofits, 50 Exempt
Org. Tax Rev. 337 (2005); Grant Williams, American University Faces Scrutiny
Over President's Pay, Spending, The Chronicle of Philanthropy, Oct. 13, 2005.
120. Riva D. Atlas & Stephanie Strom, Doesn't Anyone Want to Manage
Harvard's Money?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2005 (noting that some of the salaries of
Harvard's investment managers exceeded $35 million); Noelle Barton .& Peter
Panepento, Executive Pay Rises 4.6%, Chron. of Philanthropy, Sept. 20, 2007; Joann
S. Lublin & Daniel Golden, Golden Touch: Vanderbilt Reins In Lavish Spending By
Star Chancellor-As Schools Tighten Oversight, A $6 Million Renovation Draws
Trustees' Scrutiny-Marijuana at the Mansion, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 2006, at Al
(reporting on the repercussions from Chancellor Gordon Gee's $1.4 million dollar
salary and spending practices); Elizabeth Schwinn, Big Nonprofit Salaries Face
Government Scrutiny, Chron. of Philanthropy, June 24, 2004 (noting that "[d]espite
the slow economy, the salaries of chief executives rose 4.3 percent in 2002").
121. Although no cases of aiding and abetting the avoidance of income tax
were raised, and could be difficult to prove, it is against the law to facilitate the tax
avoidance of others. IRC § 6701.
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lobbyists to advance a viewpoint.122 One must be careful not to paint with too
broad a brush: most charities do not engage in such behavior. But the
widespread examples showed that charity could and was being used
abusively, even by the well-intentioned.
The scandals also show that the charitable sector, viewed in its
entirety, is an extremely difficult thing to understand, much less address
legislatively, in a holistic or comprehensive fashion. To a certain extent, the
scandals speak to everything, and suggest that something is wrong here, but
what? They present a case-by-case call for "reform" without neatly
presenting what the deeper problems might be. Upon reflection, the scandals
place a focus on how charity is regulated at the turn of the century, on a
charitable sector that looks much different today than the one that was in
existence when the original tax benefits were offered, and highlight
fundamental issues in the design and stability of the rules governing
charitable organizations. As discussed in the next Part of this Article (Part
IV), although the legislative response is to a certain extent cryptic on the big
picture, a careful reading of the legislation shows that the legislative policy
toward charitable organizations is shifting. Emerging from the reform
legislation is a frustration with the breadth of the charitable designation, a
resulting trend toward more categorical distinctions among charities based on
purpose, the breakdown of the public charity-private foundation distinction,
and a resort to brighter lines to aid enforcement.
PART IV. PIECEMEAL REFORM
A. The Legislative Response
The many scandals involving charitable organizations demanded a
Congressional response; and Congress responded. A flurry of hearings and
papers ensued,123 and resulted in three pieces of legislation containing
122. Minority Staff of S. Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong., Investigation of Jack
Abramoff's Use of Tax-Exempt Organizations (Comm. Print 2006).
123. In the 107th Congress, the post-9/1 1 controversy involving the
American Red Cross led to a hearing, see supra note 61. In the 108th Congress, the
hearings continued. Nonprofit Credit Counseling Organizations: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. (2003);
Pricing Practices of Hospitals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H.
Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. (2004); Charity Oversight and Reform:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin. supra note 7 (including two
witnesses who appeared with distorted voices, behind black curtains, and with
anonymous names-a "Mr. Car" described car-donation schemes, and a "Mr.
House," described abuses related to down payment assistance organizations). In
connection with the latter hearing, the staff of the Senate Finance Committee
released a "Staff Discussion Draft," a list of proposals contemplating major change
2011] 39
Florida Tax Review
in the charitable sector. See Staff of S. Comm. on Fin., Tax-Exempt Governance
Proposals: Staff Discussion Draft, available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media'
doc/062204stfdis.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2011). The Finance Committee also
subsequently conducted a closed door meeting (at which the author was present)
with representatives of the charitable community. Senate Finance Committee,
Roundtable Discussion on Exempt Organizations, July 22, 2004.
The papers and hearings continued in the 109th Congress. See Staff of Joint
Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform
Tax Expenditures 220 (Joint Comm. Print 2005) [hereinafter JCT Options Report].
In this 400-plus page document, over 100 pages provided detailed reform proposals
relating to tax-exempt organizations. The author served as Legislation Counsel to the
Joint Committee on Taxation at the time, with chief responsibility for exempt
organization issues, and so directed the exempt organizations portion of the report.
See also Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance,
and Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A Final Report to Congress and the
Nonprofit Sector (2005) (responding to a request from Senator Grassley, the
nonprofit group Independent Sector convened a panel of nonprofit experts resulting
in this report, recommending a variety of legislative, regulatory, and self-regulatory
initiatives); Charities and Charitable Giving: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,
supra note 71; The Tax Code and Land Conservation: Report on Investigations and
Proposals for Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong. (2005).
The House Committee on Ways and Means conducted a hearing that seemed to have
the potential for a groundbreaking review of the foundational law. Overview of the
Tax-Exempt Sector: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong.
(2005). The Comptroller General, the Joint Committee on Taxation Chief of Staff,
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, two law professors, a former IRS
Commissioner, and a leading nonprofit expert testified on the development of the
law of charity and generally portrayed it as chaotic, often without a clear rationale,
and suggested that a major reconsideration of the law was in order. Id. at 9
(statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. Government
Accountability Office) ("On a broad scale, a comprehensive re-examination [of the
tax-exempt sector] could help address whether exempt entities are providing services
to our citizens commensurate with their favored tax status, whether the current
number and nature of exemptions continue to make sense, whether restrictions on the
activities of tax-exempt entities remain relevant, and whether the framework for
ensuring that exempt entities adhere to the requirements attendant to their status is
satisfactory."); id. at 48 (statement of George Yin, Chief of Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation) ("[T]thirty-six years after Congress first drew a meaningful
legal distinction between publicly supported organizations and private foundations, it
may not be as clear, given the growth and diversity of publicly supported
organizations, why some of the private foundation rules are not relevant for certain
public charities, or whether some of the private foundation rules are performing their
intended purpose."); id. at 50-51 (statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director of
Congressional Budget Office) (testifying with respect to the "untaxed business
sector"); id. at 60 (statement of John D. Colombo, Professor, University of Illinois
College of Law) ("[W]hile we have this vague notion that we grant exemption to
charities because they 'do good things' for society, there has never been a
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specifically-articulated rationale that allows us to tie down exactly what good
behavior should be rewarded with exemption. . . . So in some cases we have ended
up with a sort of disconnect between our traditional views of charities and the way
they operate in the real world today."); id. at 64 (statement of Frances R. Hill,
Professor, University of Miami School of Law) ("While current law indeed provides
that provision of benefits to the designated class of beneficiaries is the foundational
requirement for exemption, this requirement has not been developed as an
affirmative requirement. Instead, administrative efforts, policy discussions, and
academic analyses focus largely on preventing impermissible private benefit.
Preventing misuse of exempt organizations' resources is a matter of central
importance. But, it does not provide either a rationale for exemption or an analytical
framework for understanding exemption. As exempt entities engage in an ever-
broadening range of activities and as the exempt sector grows larger, more dynamic
and more diverse, this is an appropriate time to consider the reasons for the
exemption and the relationships between these fundamental rationales and current
law."); id. at 71, 74 (statement of Sheldon S. Cohen, IRS Comm'r from 1965-1969)
("Questions about the tax-exempt sector are increasingly important given that the
sector is growing in both size and assets and has been playing an ever more
important role in our society. . . . The question of whether the IRS is devoting
appropriate audit attention to these organizations may depend to a large extent on
budgetary constraints and the need for enforcement efforts in other areas."); id. at 75,
77 (statement of Bruce Hopkins, Attorney) "[T]he statutory law concerning tax-
exempt organizations has evolved over the decades in a disorderly, unplanned
fashion. . . .The state of the federal tax law today is that it is unbalanced and uneven.
. . . As the sector has grown, this situation has fostered or facilitated
misunderstandings and abuses by certain tax-exempt organizations and tax law
planners. Federal tax statutory law that addresses the gaps in the present-day overall
statutory regime would provide a full legal structure that would address this
problem. This, in turn would facilitate the ability of the IRS to provide meaningful
guidance within that framework."). This hearing was followed by separate hearings
on the hospital sector, The Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. (2005), and on the deduction for fagade
easements, To Review the Tax Deduction for Fagade Easements: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. (2005).
Notwithstanding many of the above claims, Congress was also given a different
message, and opposition to reform efforts was stiff. Senator Santorum in particular
was skeptical of the need for reform. See Charities on the Frontline - How the
Nonprofit Sector Meets the Needs of America's Communities: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. and Family Policy of the S. Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong. 75
(2005) (written statement of Sen. Rick Santorum, Chairman, Subcomm. On Soc.
Sec. and Family Policy) (urging passage of the CARE Act and characterizing the
reform initiative as a "specter of a series of proposals that would collectively require
the charitable community and its donors to bear a significant burden for dubious
public benefit. There are enough laws on the books to ensure that donors are
protected-the question is enforcement."). Letters signed by reams of charitable
organizations also circulated the halls of Congress protesting the need for reform.
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significant reform-oriented provisions. The American Jobs Creation Act of
2004 (AJCA)124 enacted new rules to curtail donations of vehicles 25 and
intellectual property 26 to charitable organizations.127 The Tax Increase
Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 (TIPRA)128 enacted a stiff new
excise tax on exempt organizations that acted as accommodation parties in
tax-shelter transactions.12 9 And Title XII of the Pension Protection Act of
2006 (PPA) enacted eighteen separately-described reform provisions.13 0 Six
of these concerned noncash charitable contributions, with new rules applying
to contributions of fagade easements,"' taxidermy,13 2 fractional contributions
(typically of art), 33 clothing and household items, 34 and property intended
124. Pub. L. No. 108-357, 18 Stat. 1418 (2004).
125. Id. § 884(a) (codified as amended at IRC § 170(f)(12)) (generally
limiting the amount allowed to be deducted for charitable contributions of vehicles
(valued at over $500) to the actual sales price of the vehicle, unless the vehicle
actually is used by the charity for charitable purposes, in which case a fair market
value deduction is allowed).
126. Id. § 882 (codified as amended at IRC § 170(e)(1)(iii),(m)) (providing
that no deduction was allowed for appreciation with respect to charitable
contributions of intellectual property, but that additional charitable deductions could
be awarded based on income to the charitable donee that is attributable to the
contributed property).
127. In addition, rules to improve valuation standards and require appraisals
in certain instances also were added. Id. § 883(a) (codified as amended at IRC §
170(f)(11)). This provision was estimated to raise $102 million over ten years. Staff
of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 108th Cong., Estimated Budget Effects of the
Conference Agreement for H.R. 4520, The "American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,"
at 9 item D.3 (Joint Comm. Print 2004).
128. Pub. L. No. 109-222, 120 Stat. 345 (2006).
129. Id. § 516 (codified as amended at IRC § 4965). The provision was
based on a proposal from the JCT Options Report, supra note 123. It imposed a 100
percent excise tax on proceeds attributable to participation by a tax-exempt
organization in a "prohibited tax shelter transaction," which are transactions
identified by the Treasury Department as such (technically, as a "listed transaction")
in a Notice. If the transaction becomes a prohibited transaction after the exempt
organization enters into it, an excise tax of 35 percent applies to proceeds
attributable to the transaction and allocable to the period after the transaction became
a prohibited transaction. For additional discussion, see text accompanying notes 232-
236.
130. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Technical Explanation
of H.R. 4, the "Pension Protection Act of 2006," as Passed by the House on July 28,
2006, and as Considered by the Senate on August 3, 2006, at 283-351 (Joint Comm.
Print 2006)
131. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, § 1213 (codified as amended at
IRC § 170(h)(4)(B)).
132. Id. § 1214 (codified as amended at IRC § 170(f)(15)).
133. Id. § 1218 (codified as amended at IRC § 170(o)).
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for a charitable use but not so used.'35 New valuation penalties applied in the
case of overvaluations (for income and estate and gift tax purposes).13' All
cash contributions (and not just those of $250 or more as under prior law)
were required to be substantiated with either a bank record or by an
acknowledgement of the charity.' 37 New rules were written for supporting
organizations1 and donor advised funds.139 Credit counseling organizations
were subject to new standards for exempt status.140 The tax rates that applied
to the main private foundation excise taxes were doubled,141 as were the
dollar caps that limit the overall amount of tax that can be paid by a charity
manager under the intermediate sanctions regime.14 2 And after this initial
134. Id. § 1216 (codified as amended at IRC § 170(f)(16)).
135. Id. § 1215 (codified as amended at IRC §§ 170(e)(7), 6050L(a),
6720B).
136. Id. § 1219 (codified as amended at IRC §§ 6662 (changing thresholds
in IRC § 6662(e), (g), (h)), 6664(c), 6696, 6695A).
137. Id. § 1217 (codified as amended at IRC § 170(f)(17)). Unlike many of
the other reform provisions, substantiation for cash contributions was not a topic of
special concern and not under much discussion at the time. The provision was
introduced in part in the Senate bill to pay for the nonitemizer deduction, and also
bore a rational connection to it, since a nonitemizer deduction would introduce
millions of new taxpayers into the charitable deduction system, arguably warranting
a need for greater substantiation. However, the substantiation provision survived the
nonitemizer deduction's demise in part because it was by far the biggest revenue
raiser of all the reform provisions. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th
Cong., Estimated Budget Effects of H.R. 4, the "Pension Protection Act of 2006," as
Introduced in the House of Representatives on July 28, 2006, at 5 item XII.B.5 (Joint
Comm. Print 2006) (scoring the substantiation provision, combined with a provision
relating to changes in deductions for clothing, as raising $480 million over 10 years).
138. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, §§ 1241-1245 (codified as
amended at IRC §§ 509(f), 4942(g)(4), 4943(f), 4945(d)(4)(A)(ii),
4958(c)(3)(f)(1)(D), 6033(1)).
139. Id. §§ 1231-1235 (codified as amended at IRC §§ 170(f)(18), 508(f),
2055(e)(5), 2522(c)(5), 4943(e), 4958(c)(2), (f)(1)(E), (f)(1)(F), (f)(7), (f)(8), 4966,
4967, 6033(k)). In addition, the Department of Treasury was told to study both types
of entity. Id. § 1226.
140. Id. § 1220 (codified as amended at IRC §§ 501(q), 513(j)).
141. Id. § 1212 (codified as amended at IRC §§ 4941(a)(1), (a)(2), (c)(2),
4942(a), 4943(a)(1), 4944(a), (d)(2), 4945(a), (c)(2)).
142. Id. § 1212(a)(3) (codified as amended at IRC § 4958(d)(2)). In
addition, the base for the tax on the investment income paid by private foundations
was expanded to include appreciation from capital gain and income from alternative
investments. Id. § 1221 (codified as amended at IRC § 4940(c)(2) and
4940(c)(4)(A)). There were also three disclosure-related provisions. Id. § 1223
(codified as amended at IRC §§ 6033(i), 6033(j), 6652(c)(1)(E), 7428(b)(4))
(requiring certain small exempt organizations, otherwise exempt from annual filing
requirements, to file a short return with the IRS each year); Id. § 1225 (codified as
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wave of legislation, in March 2010, additional exemption standards for
charitable hospitals were enacted as part of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA).143
With well over 100 pages of statutory text, and multiple new
sections and subsections of the Internal Revenue Code, the reform provisions
are a lot of new law, but to what end? On the one hand, the legislation was
not comprehensive reform. Rather, it may be characterized as a targeted
response to specific problems raised by the scandals, rather than a rethinking
of regulatory approach. On the other hand, the legislation represents an
effort, conscious or not, at piecemeal or incremental reform, or perhaps,
reform by stealth.'" In this regard, as discussed in the sections that follow,
the legislation charts a path toward a new regulatory approach for charitable
organizations, one that favors more substantive distinctions among charities
for exemption purposes, questions the current basis for distinguishing among
charities, and points toward brighter enforcement lines.
B. Frustration with the Breadth of the Charitable Designation
As discussed in Part II, the federal tax law has been reluctant to
impose affirmative positive requirements on charitable organizations.145
Until recently, if an organization was a hospital, a university, a museum, an
opera, a soup kitchen, an advocacy organization, a credit counseling
organization, a homeless shelter, a local charity with $50,000 in annual
amended at IRC § 6104(d)(1)(A)(ii)) (making the unrelated business income tax
return a public document); Id. § 1224 (codified as amended at IRC §§ 6103(a)(2),
(p)(3)(A), 6104(c)(2)-(c)(6), 7213(a)(2), 7213A(a)(2), 7431(a)(2)) (facilitating
information sharing between the IRS and State attorneys general). There were also
two other provisions. See id. § 1211 (codified as amended at IRC § 6050V), § 1223
(codified as amended at IRC § 7701(o)).
143. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, § 9007.
144. Often, legislation is a product of the process that precedes it. Virtually
all the charity-reform legislation originated on the Senate side, and the process there
was focused on stopping abuse. The hearings produced a sense that something in the
charitable sector was not right and needed fixing, but in general were designed just
to make that very point. This ultimately proved to be a successful strategy for getting
legislation enacted, but was less successful in producing legislation that addressed
issues beyond the fairly limited scope of a given provision's target, whether it be
contributions of fagade easements or donor advised funds. That said, the Senate
provisions were mindful of the larger context in which they were presented, and to a
certain extent are legislative seeds, planted in the Internal Revenue Code, for later
possible growth (or, perhaps, extinction). The process in the House was to lay a
foundation for legislation that could address fundamental issues, but, at the end of
the day, the House ran out of time to develop an alternative product to the Senate.
145. Also as noted above, the main exception to this is the private
foundation payout requirement. IRC § 4942.
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receipts, an international charity with $10,000,000 in annual receipts, a fee-
for-service organization that does not rely significantly on donations, or a
charity that primarily raises money through donations and gives away its
services, the same open-ended statutory standards apply for purposes of the
charitable designation. 146
Although such an open-ended standard has benefits, it also comes
with costs. The lack of affirmative standards for charity makes measurement
and enforcement of charity difficult, a problem magnified the size of the
sector. One alternative might be to impose requirements in the nature of how
charitable resources are spent and for whom or to narrow the current broad
scope of "charity."1 4 7 Another, less divisive, response is to focus on process.
Positive but process-oriented requirements do not mandate that a specific
type or amount of "charity" be provided, but nonetheless require action by
the charity, action intended to facilitate production of the charitable good.
The reform legislation took significant steps toward a more process-oriented
approach to defining charity, one that can be tailored to distinct charitable
purposes. As such, the reform legislation signals a shift away from a one-
size fits all statutory standard for charitable organizations. As discussed
below, credit counseling organizations and hospitals are cases in point.
1. Credit Counseling Organizations
The credit counseling industry is only a small part of the charitable
sector-but, importantly, like hospitals, or colleges and universities, it is
distinct and severable in terms of function. Indeed, the problem presented by
credit counseling organizations is in many ways a perfect microcosm of what
can go wrong. The original purpose of the credit counseling organization
146. The IRS may and does require that different types of organizations
provide different information for purposes of an exemption application or
information return. For example, hospitals and schools must file a distinct schedule
with their application and annual return. Private foundations file a completely
different annual information return, the Form 990-PF, than do public charities, which
file the Form 990 or Form 990-EZ.
147. For example, charity for federal income tax purposes could be defined
in its ordinary sense: relief of the poor. However, this approach to charity, for better
or worse, was abandoned in 1959 when the Treasury adopted the legal definition of
charity. See, e.g., JCT Historical Development, supra note 5, at 65. Although
rhetoric is often expressed that charitable organizations should be those that serve
the needy, and the failure of a need-based component to charity often plays a role in
criticism of charitable organizations, there is not much evidence that Congress is
seriously interested in providing a more substantive and positive definition of
charity. However, as discussed herein, there is increasing evidence that the breadth
of the charitable designation, and the relative absence of standards, is becoming less
acceptable as the status quo, and that more must be asked of charity in some fashion.
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was to educate consumers about the judicious use of credit. The traditional
role of credit counseling organizations was described in a Senate Hearing as
follows:
Since the 1960's, consumers with credit card debt regularly
turned to their local non-profit credit counseling agency for
advice and financial education. Consumers were given face-
to-face counseling sessions with trained counselors. Credit
counselors conducted a detailed budget analysis with a
consumer, analyzed their spending habits, determined why
the consumer was in debt, and educated the consumer in
how to avoid falling back into debt. . . . Under traditional
social service models, consumers who could not afford to
make all their monthly credit card payments often enrolled
in a debt management plan . . . which allowed them to
consolidate their debts from several credit cards, reduce their
monthly payments, and lower their interest rates. The
traditional credit counseling agencies provided counseling,
education, and debt management plans free of charge or for
minimal contributions. 148
The IRS recognized the charitable status of such credit counseling
organizations in the 1960s by revenue ruling. 14 9 However, the industry found
the limitations in the ruling too constraining, and sought charitable status
notwithstanding that services would not be restricted to the poor and nominal
fees would be charged for enrolling in debt management plans. The IRS
rejected charitable status for such groups, but was overturned in court.so
Thus an incremental expansion of charitable status was allowed.
By the early 2000s, the industry had changed. Pursuant to an
investigation of credit counseling organizations in 2004, the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs described the industry as follows.
New and aggressive credit counseling agencies have
changed the manner in which consumers are treated. These
changes have resulted in consumer complaints about
148. Profiteering in a Non-Profit Industry - Abusive Practices in Credit
Counseling: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S.
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 1-2 (2004) (opening statement of
Sen. Norm Coleman).
149. Rev. Rul. 69-441, 1962-2 C.B. 115.
150. Consumer Credit Counseling Serv. of Ala., Inc. v. United States, 44
A.F.T.R. 2d (IRA) 5122 (D.D.C. 1978) (involving 24 agencies throughout the
United States); see also Credit Counseling Ctrs. of Okla., Inc., v. United States, 45
A.F.T.R. 2d (RIA) 1401 (D.D.C. 1979).
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excessive fees, pressure tactics, nonexistent counseling and
education, promised results that never come about, ruined
credit ratings, poor service, in many cases being left in
worse debt than before they initiated their debt management
plan.15
Some credit counseling agencies were described as "telemarketing
sweatshops designed to take advantage of thousands of people in bad
financial positions."' 52 Their primary purpose it was said was to "sell a
product-the Debt Management Plan-not to deliver a service of education
and counseling."1 3
One explanation for the demise of credit counseling organizations
rings true: "[M]oney is the root cause of these problems." 54 The new credit
counseling agencies were conglomerates, with the charitable organization the
lure to bring in consumers who would be sold a debt management plan for
excessive fees that would be "siphoned off' by affiliated for-profit
companies. The credit counseling organization would pay affiliates for
promotional materials, advertising, processing of applications, and other
services. Managers of the credit counseling organization and the affiliates
would be enriched at the expense of the consumer, who would receive io
counseling and end up in worse financial condition than before.
Although greed may explain the abuse, if the enforcement apparatus
had been effective, the abuse should have been stopped earlier. Many credit
counseling organizations were in clear violation of the operational test of
section 501(c)(3) and were not operated for public benefit. But it was only
once abuses became widely reported, and Congress started looking into the
matter, that the IRS began a serious investigation of the industry, placing
tens of organizations under audit (including 40 percent of the entire revenue
of the industry) and eventually revoking the charitable status of many of
them.15
Importantly, notwithstanding the enforcement effort, Congress
decided to legislate new exemption standards for credit counseling
organizations. In so doing, Congress carved out credit counseling
organizations from the generic framework of section 501 (c)(3), and provided
a series of distinct bright-line standards for charitable status. Thus, after the
PPA, if an organization has the provision of credit counseling services as a
151. Profiteering in a Non-Profit Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on




154. Id. at 4.
155. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of Tax
Legislation Enacted in the 109th Cong. 609-10 (Joint Comm. Print 2007).
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substantial purpose, then, to be charitable, six extensive requirements must
be met.'5 6 These include rules about the composition of the governing body,
rules requiring a reasonable fee policy (one that requires provision of
services even if the consumer does not have the ability to pay), rules about
permissible practices (no loans to debtors, no separate charges for improving
credit records, no solicitation of voluntary contributions from its customers),
rules about ownership of related entities, and rules limiting the amount of
allowable revenue from debt management plans. 5 7
Such statutory precision, some would say micro-management,
regarding the conditions of charitable status for a particular type of
organization was unprecedented. It represents a significant conceptual shift,
considering that the general operating principle of federal charity tax law has
been that for purposes of the exemption standard, all public charities are
created equally; that is, if you have a "good" purpose, the law will not
adversely discriminate because of such purpose.'58 Even when Congress
created second-class citizenship for private foundations, foundations
generally were disfavored because the form of the foundation could lead to
abuse, and not because of the substance of their charitable activity. so By
contrast, credit counseling organizations now are singled out by their
purpose, and special rules are applied on this basis.
Further, any class of charitable organization could be given its own
subsection of the Code. Indeed, as if to signal as much, in describing the new
requirements imposed on credit counseling organizations, the legislative
history to the provisiono60 provides in a footnote that the requirements to
156. The statutory language preceding the requirements is that the credit
counseling organization must be "organized and operated in accordance with the
following requirements. . . ." IRC § 501(q). By contrast, the normal blanket
charitable exemption standard (the organizational and operational test) is that the
organization be "organized and operated exclusively for . .. charitable ... purposes."
IRC § 501(c)(3).
157. IRC § 501(q).
158. There is some affirmative discrimination based on purpose: churches,
hospitals, and colleges and universities are generally considered to be "public
charities" (and not private foundations) by definition-that is, based on their
purpose. IRC § 509(a)(1).
159. See infra note 176.
160. JCT PPA Technical Explanation, supra note 130, at 263-363.
Typically, legislation such as the Pension Protection Act would have "official"
legislative history in the form of a conference report. For political reasons, the
conference committee that would have reported out the PPA was disbanded, and the
final legislation was negotiated outside of formal conference procedures.
Accordingly, there is no conference report. The floor managers of the legislation,
William Thomas (for the House) and Charles Grassley (for the Senate) both made
statements on the floor to the effect that the Technical Explanation of the PPA
written by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation was to be treated as if it were
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provide services irrespective of ability to pay, the requirement to establish a
reasonable fee policy, and the necessity of an independent governing body
are
core issues that are related to tax-exempt status and that have proved
to be problematic in the credit counseling industry. . . . No inference
is intended through the provision of these specific requirements on
credit counseling organizations that similar or more stringent
requirements should not be adhered to by other exempt organizations
providing fees for services. Rather, the provision affirms the
importance of these core issues to the matter of tax exemption, both
to credit counseling organizations and to other types of exempt
organizations.16 1
In sum, the credit counseling legislation speaks to a frustration with
open-ended exemption standards and with an enforcement apparatus that was
slow to respond to a growing problem. The theory of the legislation is that if
the statute provides more precise standards and brighter lines as to when a
particular type of organization may qualify as charitable, then it will be
easier to prevent bad entrants from sullying an otherwise important industry.
Afterward, the immediate question then became whether credit counseling
organizations presented a unique situation, or whether this was a legislative
precedent and model for the future for any organization that provides a
particular type of service or performs charity in a particular manner.
the conference report. 152 Cong. Rec. S. 8747, 8763 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2006)
(statement of Sen. Max Baucus) ("A fair and good explanation of the bill can be
found in The Technical Explanation of H.R. 4 prepared by the Joint Committee on
Taxation."); id. (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley) ("I would like to incorporate by
reference a technical explanation being prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee
on Taxation that describes the legislative intent with respect to H.R. 4, the Pension
Protection Act of 2006. This document expresses our understanding of the
provisions in the bill, and it will be a useful reference in understanding the
legislation. Chairman [of the House Ways and Means Committee William] Thomas
also made a statement on the floor of the House of Representatives last Friday that
he had requested this technical explanation. The technical explanation will be
published by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation as document number JCX-
38-06, Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, The Pension Protection Act of 2006, as
passed by the House on July 28, 2006, and as considered by the Senate on August 3,
2006.").
161. JCT PPA Technical Explanation, supra note 130, at 318 n. 435
(emphasis added). The clear implication is that good governance, reasonable fees,
provision of free services to the needy are "unwritten" conditions of charitable
status.
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2. Hospitals
As it quickly turned out, the credit counseling approach was a
harbinger. In March 2010, following the lead of the credit counseling
provision, Congress adopted new exemption standards for charitable
hospitals.
As a class, hospitals are perhaps the most prominent part of the
charitable sector, and have long raised questions about the breadth and
amorphous nature of the charitable designation. Many hospitals are
charitable for tax purposes yet may seem indistinguishable from a non-
charitable and taxable for-profit hospital. Both, after all, perform similar
functions. One obvious base for distinction is organizational form. The no-
private-inurement requirement of section 501(c)(3) dictates that a charitable
organization not have shareholders or stakeholders, a requirement clearly not
met by a for-profit hospital. But organizational form is an unsatisfying basis
to distinguish a for-profit and charitable hospital. Surely, there must be an
operational difference. Thus the questions have been what a charitable
hospital must do that is different from a for-profit hospital and what
specifically is charitable about a section 501(c)(3) hospital. Since 1969, the
legal answer has been that a charitable hospital must provide a "community
benefit";162 a standard, however that has been widely criticized for its lack of
positive requirements. 16 3 Accordingly, the pressure point for charitable
hospitals as a class of organization has been whether to impose affirmative
positive requirements, such as free or charity care, as a condition of the
charitable designation, or whether general open-ended standards are
sufficient.
Although the PPA deferred hospital-specific legislation to another
day,'" that day came in March 2010. Pursuant to the PPACA, hospitals, like
162. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
163. It is beyond the scope of this article to weigh into this important and
ongoing debate. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, The Failure of Community Benefit, 15
Health Matrix 29 (2005); Minority Staff of S. Comm. on Fin., Tax-Exempt
Hospitals: Discussion Draft (2007), available at http://grassley.senate.gov
/releases/2007/07182007.pdf; Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?,
24 Yale J. on Reg. 139 (2007); Robert Pear, Hospitals Mobilizing to Fight Proposed
Charity Care Rules, N.Y. Times, June 1, 2009, at A12.
164. After enactment of the PPA, then-Chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee William Thomas introduced legislation that would have required
hospitals to provide free care to the poor, limited the amount hospitals could charge
to the uninsured, and limited the debt collection practices of hospitals. H.R. 6420,
109th Cong. (2006). The IRS also took steps by releasing a new schedule to the
annual information return for hospitals to complete annually (Schedule H to the
Form 990), requiring hospitals to document the community benefit provided. The
IRS also completed a study of the charity care and community benefit provided by
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credit counseling organizations before them, now are subject to additional
requirements to satisfy the charitable designation. Under PPACA, to
maintain charitable status, hospitals must, among other things, conduct a
"community needs assessment" at least once every three years,165 establish a
written financial assistance policyl 66 and a written policy relating to the
provision of emergency medical care,'67 limit the amount of charges to
certain patients for emergency or other medically necessary care,' and
refrain from engaging in "extraordinary collection actions" without first
making reasonable efforts to discover whether a patient is eligible for
financial assistance. New reporting requirements170 and excise taxes also
apply.171
A full discussion of these new requirements is outside the scope of
this Article, but a few points are noteworthy here. The legislation signals that
Congress has, at least for a time, waved the white flag on imposing
affirmative positive requirements on hospitals. The central issue driving the
hospital debate was identifying the charitable characteristic of a hospital, and
was often framed in terms of whether section 501(c)(3) hospitals provided a
significant measure of charity care or could otherwise demonstrate a benefit
to the community that differed from a community benefit provided by non
section 501(c)(3) hospitals. Yet, the new standards for hospitals do not
squarely address this issue. Instead of imposing a substantive positive
requirement of charity, the legislation settles instead for process-oriented
rules that are designed to promote a more charitable outcome. For example,
the financial assistance and emergency care policies, and requirements to
stop overcharging the indigent and performing unreasonable collections are
anti-abuse oriented:'72 i.e., focusing on stopping manifestly uncharitable
behavior. Although important, this of course is different from affirmatively
requiring charitable activity. To refrain from behaving badly is not, or should
not be, equated with behaving well. The community needs assessment comes
closer to addressing the charity question. By requiring section 501(c)(3)
hospitals formally to assess the needs of their communities, the legislation
nonprofit hospitals and of their compensation practices. See supra note 10. In 2007,
the Senate Finance Committee Minority Staff released a discussion draft of
proposals, including recommendations that hospitals be required to provide some
charity care as a condition of tax-exempt status. Minority Staff of S. Comm on Fin.,
Tax Exempt Hospitals: Discussion Draft (2007).
165. IRC § 501(r)(3).
166. IRC § 501(r)(4)(A).
167. IRC § 501(r)(4)(B).
168. IRC § 501(r)(5).
169. IRC § 501(r)(6).
170. IRC § 6033(b)(15).
171. IRC § 4959.
172. IRC § 501(r)(5), (6).
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aims to force hospitals to consider how they are integrated within the
communities they serve and, therefore, to take active steps to foster a
community (and charitable) benefit. Notably, however, the legislation stays
well on the side of process, providing no hint as to what a community benefit
might be in substance.1 3
The legislation also floats a trial balloon, which might be styled as
the "mother of all process-oriented" positive requirements-a rule that the
Treasury review at least once every three years "the community benefit
activities of each hospital organization" covered by the legislation. 174
Although time will tell whether or not such a rule can make a meaningful
impact (especially if funding is not available), the reason for such a rule in
conjunction with the other process-oriented requirements is to keep the
pressure on the hospital actually to do something charitable. A three-year
review, in effect of charitable status, is a specter held over the hospital to
provide proof of charity. Because there is no actionable definition of charity,
or community benefit, however, there is likely to be frustration on both sides:
how is a hospital to know whether its "community benefit activities" are
sufficient; and how is the IRS to prove that a hospital is not discharging its
obligations, whatever they may be? To a certain extent, the three-year review
requirement is undermined by the presence of the other new hospital-level
requirements: if a hospital conducts the community needs assessment and
has in place the requisite policies, on what basis will the IRS revoke
charitable status? The answer must be for failure to provide a community
benefit. But this argument will be more difficult for the IRS to win if a
hospital has fully complied with required processes.
In addition to highlighting the difficulty of imposing substantive
positive charitable requirements, the legislation shows that Congress
continues to wrestle with the all-or-nothing nature of the charitable
designation. The new requirements are all conditions of charitable status. In
theory at least, this means that if a charitable hospital violates a requirement,
for example by engaging once in an unreasonable collection activity, the
hospital's charitable status is revoked. This outcome is highly unlikely,
however, making these new requirements aspirational in nature-i.e., a
173. The advantage to such an approach is that a "community" based
standard is local in nature and so arguably not amenable to a prescriptive top-down
approach. Nonetheless, Congress clearly remains concerned about charity care, as
evidenced by the requirement that the Secretary of the Treasury, in conjunction with
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, submit an annual
report to Congress regarding the level of charity care provided by all hospitals
(taxable, charitable, and government) and, in five years, to provide a study on the
trends shown in the annual reports. Pub. Law No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, § 9007(e).
174. Id. § 9007(c). The three-year review proposal is reminiscent of a five-
year review proposal suggested for all charities suggested by the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation in 2005. JCT Options Report, supra note 123, at 220-229.
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sanction is plausible only in the most egregious of cases. There is one
additional sanction, however. The failure to conduct a community needs
assessment results in an excise tax of $50,000."' Yet the excise tax is not an
intermediate sanction, but comes in addition to loss of charitable status. On
its face, therefore, it would seem to provide no additional incentive to
perform the community needs assessment, or even give the IRS an additional
enforcement tool. In practice, however, it may turn out to be an intermediate
sanction, imposed independently of revocation.
In sum, the new rules for hospitals highlight the law's continuing
struggles with developing workable standards within the current legal
framework. This latest effort to tighten the standards for charitable status
highlights how difficult it is when there are no positive charitable obligations
to enforce and the principal sanction is revocation of charitable status. The
most plausible outcome will be more process, more bureaucracy, and
arguably, even less charity. Regardless, the fact that Congress, following the
credit counseling model, has decided further to fragment the charitable
sector, is more evidence of frustration with the historical approach of one
statutory standard for all.
C. Breakdown of the Public Charity-Private Foundation Distinction
1. In General
As discussed in Part II, initially, the law made no distinction among
charitable organizations: all charities in effect were treated equally. Yet, as
time passed, the private foundation, as it came to be called, was singled out
for adverse treatment.'76
175. IRC § 4959. Interestingly, on its face, the $50,000 excise tax appears
to apply to for-profit as well as charitable hospitals. Organizations subject to the tax
are "hospital organization[s] to which section 501(r) applies." Id. Section 501(r)
applies by its terms to "an organization which operates a facility which is required
by a State to be licensed, registered, or similarly recognized as a hospital." IRC §
501(r)(2)(A)(i). For-profit hospitals, like nonprofit hospitals, generally are required
to be licensed by a State as a hospital. It follows that the other requirements of §
501(r) also apply to for-profit hospitals, but the sanction for failure to meet such
other requirements is loss of charitable status, not a financial penalty. Loss of
charitable status would of course have no effect on, and so would not be applicable
to, a for-profit hospital.
176. Although not formally codified until 1969, the private foundation
existed, and was disfavored, beforehand. For an overview of the pre-1969 legal
differences between public and private charities, see JCT Historical Development,
supra note 5, at 85-89. Notwithstanding a complex legal definition, IRC § 509, at its
core, a private foundation is a fund of money, typically a large fund, controlled by a
few people (i.e., "private," shielded from public control or influence) and established
for a worthy cause. However, the close control of the foundation, often by persons
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The private foundation is defined in the negative, as a charity that
cannot qualify as a public charity.177 The question defining the distinction
then is what makes a charity "public." Some organizations are deemed public
charities because of their function and role in the community: hospitals,
colleges and universities, and churches.178 For most other organizations to
qualify, they must satisfy a public support test. 179 The theory is that all such
"public" organizations will be overseen effectively by their donor or service-
based community. Such oversight, lacking for a private foundation, means in
theory that the public charity is less susceptible to abuse, and so should
escape additional regulation. 80 In effect, by distinguishing public charity
with a sense of entitlement to its assets, means that the temptation to spend
foundation money for personal use or extravagance is always present. This structural
problem, among other things, made foundations a target of reform in the mid
twentieth century. See infra note 179. See Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private
Foundations Law: Historical Perspectives on Its Origins and Underpinnings, 27
Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 52 (2000). IRC §§ 509, 4941-4945. Over forty years later, the
private foundation rules have withstood criticism and remained remarkably intact,
considering their stringency and the tendency of Congress to relax rules over time.
177. IRC § 509 (defining a private foundation negatively, as everything
other than an organization described in § 509(a)(1)-(4)). Although the term "public
charity" is not itself a defined term in the Code, it has become a term of art to
describe all charities other than private foundations.
178. IRC §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
179. IRC §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(iv), 170(b)(1)(A)(vi), 509(a)(2). There
are other public charities: a supporting organization (IRC § 509(a)(3)), a
governmental unit also organized as § 501(c)(3) organization (IRC §§ 509(a)(1) and
170(b)(1)(A)(v)), and a public safety organization (IRC § 509(a)(4)). Although very
complex, the public support tests are designed to ensure that the organization has
widespread public support, something a private foundation, classically understood,
will not be able to do if it is funded by a single donor or family. Regs. §§ 1.170A-9,
1.509(a)-3.
180. As Thomas Troyer noted in discussing the history of the 1969 Act:
"For public charities . . . there was no even remotely similar body of evidence of
abuses of the sort that were the principal focus of the foundation legislation; and
Congress quite naturally did not prescribe the foundation remedies where it found no
foundation-like ills." Troyer, supra note 176. In 1996, Congress realized that insider
dealing was a problem at public charities as well as private foundations, that
revocation of charitable status was not an effective sanction, and so enacted the
"intermediate sanctions" regime for public charities. See infra note 39. The notable
difference between the two self-dealing regimes is that the private foundations are
generally barred (through imposition of steep excise taxes) from insider deals
(including loans, sales of property, use of charitable assets for non-charitable
purposes) while the public charity regime permits such transactions, so long as they
are at fair market value. Where the two regimes coalesce is on compensation: it is
allowed, but must be reasonable. Compare IRC § 4941, with § 4958.
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from private foundation in this way, Congress assumed that public charities
did not raise the same concerns, either as a matter of form or substance.
The consequences of being public or private are stark. Operationally,
a comprehensive anti-abuse regime-a series of negative restrictions-
applies to private foundations, and is enforced by stiff excise taxes. The anti-
abuse rules target four areas: self-dealing between the foundation and
foundation insiders, excessive ownership of a for-profit business, the making
of risky investments, and spending for non-charitable purposes.' 8 ' In
addition, private foundations are subject to a key positive requirement-they
must pay out a percentage of investment assets each year for charitable
purposes.182 Private foundations also are disfavored for purposes of the
charitable deduction rules: a smaller percentage of a taxpayer's gross income
may be deducted as a charitable contribution to a private foundation than to a
public charity,' 83 and a fair market value deduction generally is not available
for charitable contributions of appreciated noncash property to private
foundations (other than publicly traded securities). 8 Finally, as noted
earlier, most private foundations but not public charities also must pay a tax
on investment income. 85
The existence of the distinction is important conceptually because it
demonstrates in law and policy a preference for certain categories of
charitable organizations over others. Relatedly, the distinction also shows
that, at least with respect to certain types of charity, affirmative positive
requirements can be made a condition of exemption: i.e., the private
foundation pay-out requirement. That said, the public charity-private
foundation distinction is largely one of form and not substance. The
differential treatment between the two types is based not on whether a
specific activity or purpose should be preferred (e.g., by providing greater
incentives for soup kitchens over the opera), but rather on the likelihood of
abuse occurring at one or another type of charity. In addition, public charities
also are preferred to private foundations, especially for charitable deduction
purposes, because of the manner in which charity is delivered. A public
charity directly provides a charitable benefit through operation of charitable
181. IRC §§ 4941, 4943, 4944, 4945. It is beyond the scope of this Article
to inquire into the rationales and rules for each of these provisions.
182. IRC § 4942. Even prior to 1969, Congress was concerned about
unreasonable accumulations of income. See Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 331 (1950)
(imposing a reporting requirement for income accumulations by certain charitable
organizations).
183. IRC § 170(b). Charitable contributions to public charities are
deductible up to 50 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income (30 percent in
the case of capital gain property) as compared to 30 percent for contributions to most
private foundations (20 percent in the case of capital gain property).
184. IRC § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii), (e)(5).
185. IRC § 4940.
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programs; whereas a private foundation indirectly provides a charitable
benefit through grants to others who will perform a charitable task. Thus,
money given to a public charity arguably will get to the charitable
beneficiary faster than money given to a private foundation, wherein there
typically is a pause between the contribution and the realization of charity. 86
The distinction also evidences a resort to a brighter-line enforcement regime
when abuse of charitable status becomes a concern.
The scandals of the early 2000s challenged the basis for the public
charity-private foundation distinction. Notwithstanding the Boston Globe
Spotlight series criticizing private foundations, most of the charities
subjected to media scrutiny during this period were public charities. The
allegations of abusive practices at iconic (and other) public charities such as
the United Way and The Nature Conservancy, and at charities viewed as
pillars of the community, hospitals and colleges and universities in
particular, showed that the public support or inherent status approach to a
public charity did not necessarily protect against abusive activity. Further,
abuses reported at donor advised funds and supporting organizations directly
called the distinction into question. Both donor advised funds and supporting
organizations resembled private foundations in terms of function (as grant-
making organizations) and by the influence of a donor over the distribution
of assets. Yet both are considered public charities (supporting organizations
because of a relationship to a public charity, and donor advised funds by
satisfying the public support test), and so were not subject to the tougher
rules.
With the focus thus on abuses at public charities, a question arose
whether additional anti-abuse rules are necessary for public charities, and if
so, which ones? Should the private foundation anti-abuse regime simply be
extended to public charities?'87 To the extent that self-dealing with
organization insiders at public charities is not sufficiently addressed by
current law,'8 8 current law could be replaced with the less forgiving private-
foundation self-dealing rules.'89 Similarly, the accumulation of charitable
186. This is also expressed through the provision that, for purposes of the
percentage limitations, treats charitable contributions to certain "operating" private
foundations, i.e., those that conduct active charitable programs, and to private
foundations that distribute all of their income from contributions each year (conduit
foundations), the same as charitable contributions to public charities. IRC §§
170(b)(1)(A)(vii), 170(b)(1)(F).
187. See Marion Fremont-Smith, Is it Time to Treat Private Foundations
and Public Charities Alike? 2006 Tax Notes Today 112-102, June 12, 2006.
188. IRC § 4958.
189. IRC § 4941. See Staff of S. Comm. on Fin., Tax Exempt Governance
Proposals: Staff Discussion Draft, http://finance.senate.gov/imo/medialdoc
/062204stfdis.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (suggesting that the private foundation
self-dealing rules apply to public charities).
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funds is not the exclusive province of private foundations. Public charities of
course raise and accumulate money, the most obvious example being that of
the large endowments held by many colleges and universities. Should public
charities, like private foundations, be subject to private foundation-like
payout rules?' 90 Public charities commonly are owners of for-profit
enterprises-a generally accepted and largely unexamined facet of the
charitable sector. Private foundations, however, generally may not own
significant portions of a business.' 9 ' Should the excess business holdings
rules be extended to public charities?' 92 Public charities, like private
foundations, make investments and spend money. But private foundations
and not public charities face excise taxes for investments that jeopardize
exempt purposes and for expenditures not for a charitable purpose. 93 Should
public charities or their managers be subject to tax for imprudent investments
or non-charitable spending?' 9
Although the scandals directly or indirectly raised these questions,
Congress did not explicitly consider the ongoing validity of the public
charity-private foundation distinction in the PPA or other legislation. Indeed,
the public charity-private foundation distinction remains a conceptual
backbone of federal charity tax law. However, the very presence of the
private foundation regime serves as a ready-made panacea for concerns
about public charities. Accordingly, Congress made liberal use of the private
foundation rules in its reform efforts for two types of public charity, namely
donor advised funds and supporting organizations. As discussed below,
Congress applied private foundation-like rules for such organizations in the
areas of the charitable deduction, self-dealing, payout, excess business
holdings, and taxable expenditures. The result is that the distinction, already
a questionable basis for distinguishing among charities, is beginning to
collapse from its own weight.
190. IRC § 4942.
191. IRC § 4943; see IRC § 512(b)(13) for special unrelated business
income tax rules applicable to payments by a business controlled by a public charity.
192. IRC § 4943. See e.g., Richard Schmalbeck, Reconsidering Private
Foundation Investment Limitations, 58 Tax L. R. 59 (arguing, not suggesting, for
reconsideration of the private excess business holdings and jeopardizing investments
as applied to private foundations).
193. IRC § § 4944, 4945.
194. See S. Comm. on Finance, Tax Exempt Governance Proposals: Staff
Discussion Draft, available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc
/062204stfdis.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (suggesting that a prudent investor
standard be adopted for public charities). The recent controversy relating to
disgraced financier Robert Madoff, and the heavy investment by university
endowments in alternative investments are ongoing illustrations of the issue.
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2. Selectively Importing Private Foundation Rules for Public
Charities
(i) Selective incorporation with respect to the charitable
deduction
The first recent blurring of the line between public charity and
private foundation came from an unlikely source, the Katrina Emergency
Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA).'9 ' KETRA was the legislative response to
the devastating hurricane that hit the Gulf Coast region in August 2005, and
included a package of temporary charitable giving incentives.' 9 6 With respect
to one such incentive, which waived the percentage limitations that apply to
charitable contributions, 97  Congress without warning expressed its
dissatisfaction with the allocation of the charitable deduction among charities
by carving out donor advised funds and supporting organizations (as well as
private foundations) as ineligible charities for purposes of the incentive.19 8
Although the policy rationale for the carve-out was not made
explicit, the context of the bill provides an explanation. The purpose of the
provision was to encourage charitable contributions to charity in the wake of
a disaster. By declaring donor advised funds and private foundations as
ineligible categories of charity for this purpose, Congress said that donor
advised funds and private foundations were not the right sort of charity,
regardless of their "public" or "private" character. This conclusion is
consistent with the understanding that private foundations and donor advised
195. Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 Stat. 2016.
196. Id. at §§ 301 (amending IRC § 170(b) to waive the percentage
limitations for certain charitable contributions), 303 (amending IRC § 170(i) to
increase the standard mileage rate for the charitable use of vehicles), 304 (providing
an exclusion for certain mileage reimbursements to charitable volunteers), 305
(amending IRC § 170(e) to provide an enhanced charitable deduction for certain
contributions of food inventory), 306 (amending IRC § 170(e) to provide an
enhanced charitable deduction for certain contributions of book inventory).
197. Normally, charitable contributions to public charities are deductible up
to 50 percent of an individual taxpayer's adjusted gross income (or ten percent of a
corporation's adjusted taxable income). IRC § 170(b)(1)(A). KETRA waived this
limitation, allowing a charitable deduction to completely offset adjusted gross
income. The income limitation waiver was later extended to cover relief efforts
related to Hurricanes Wilma and Rita. See IRC § 1400S(a). This was the first time
Congress had recognized the existence of a "donor advised fund" as a technical legal
matter, though without actually using the term. See Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 Stat.
2016, § 301(d)(2). The legislative history to the provision gave additional guidance.
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Technical Explanation of H.R.
3768, "The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005" as Passed by the House and
the Senate on September 21, 2005, at 16 (Comm. Print 2005).
198. Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 Stat. 2016, § 301(d)(1)(A) & (d)(2).
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funds are primarily grant-making organizations and Congress wanted to
favor not public charities as such, but charities that would spend the money
quickly and not accumulate funds.'99 Accordingly, in KETRA, Congress
took a significant step by disfavoring a public charity, as against other public
charities, based on the manner in which the donor advised fund provided
charity, and by analogizing to the private foundation regime.
The PPA followed through on this development with respect to the
so-called "IRA rollover" provision.200 This charitable giving incentive allows
owners of an individual retirement account (IRA) to exclude from tax
distributions from an IRA to a charitable organization. Although the proposal
had been "in play" for years, there had been no effort to discriminate as to
which types of charities would benefit.2 0 1 However, the House-Senate
negotiations on the provision introduced a rule that declared gifts to private
foundations, donor advised funds, and supporting organizations as ineligible
for the exclusion.202 Thus, following the lead of KETRA, Congress again
199. The rationale for the provision is made somewhat murky by its history.
Moving quickly after the hurricane, both House and Senate adopted their own tax
incentive packages. See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong.,
Technical Explanation of H.R. 3768, "The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of
2005" as Passed by the House and the Senate on Sept. 21, 2005, at 1 (Comm. Print
2005). One key difference between the two packages was that the House charitable
provisions generally provided incentives only for activities related to the provision
of disaster relief. By contrast, the Senate charitable provisions were not so limited. In
the Senate, the theory was that charities other than disaster-relief charities needed
relief, in part because the normal flows of charitable dollars were being redirected to
disaster relief organizations. Compare, e.g., S. 1696, 109th Cong. § 301 (as
introduced in the Senate, Sept. 13, 2005) (defining a qualified contribution for
purposes of waiving the charitable contribution limitations as a charitable
contributions for any purpose), with H.R. 3768, 109th Cong. § 102 (as introduced in
the House, Sept.14, 2005) (defining such contributions as made for purposes of
hurricane relief efforts).
200. "IRA rollover" is an inapposite name, as no "rollover" of funds is
involved.
201. The provision was part of the original package of charitable giving
proposals in President Bush's first budget to Congress. In the original H.R. 7
considered by the House and the Senate Finance Committee, all charities were
eligible beneficiaries. See H.R. 7, 107th Cong., § 102 (as passed by the House, July
19, 2001); H.R. 7, 107th Cong., § 102 (as reported in the Senate, July 19, 2001). In
general, there were two principal ongoing issues: whether distributions could be
made to split interest trusts as well as charities, and the age an IRA owner must
attain before making excludable distributions (59 1/2 or 70 1/2). Under the PPA,
distributions to split interest trusts do not qualify for the exclusion and the threshold
age of the IRA owner is 70 1/2. IRC § 408(d)(8).
202. Compare The Tax Relief Act of 2005, S. 2020, 109th Cong., § 302 (as
passed by the Senate, Nov. 18, 2005) (defining all charities as eligible beneficiaries),
with Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, § 1201 (excluding private foundations,
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lumped donor advised funds and supporting organizations with private
foundations and disfavored both as compared to other public charities.
Further, unlike KETRA, the IRA distribution giving incentive is generally
applicable, that is, it is not a one-time incentive in response to a particular
event (Hurricane Katrina) and so has greater force as a matter of policy.
The PPA (and AJCA before it) also began to bridge the public
charity-private foundation divide on the charitable deduction through new
rules on certain types of noncash charitable contributions. The many scandals
involving such contributions prompted a variety of legislative responses,
some of which explicitly invoked the private foundation rule on noncash
contributions. As noted above, with respect to appreciated property, a fair
market value-based deduction is available for contributions to public
charities but generally not to private foundations.20 3 Appreciated property
contributions to private foundations generally are limited to the donor's basis
(or cost) in the property. This takes away the incentive to provide inflated
valuations, thus significantly minimizing the opportunities for abuse. In
AJCA, Congress was concerned about the high valuations of intellectual
property contributions, particularly with respect to patents, and adopted the
private foundation rule for such contributions.20 Similarly, though on a more
narrow issue, Congress responded to valuation concerns with respect to
contributions of taxidermy property by following the private foundation
rule.205
(ii) Selective incorporation with respect to self-dealing
Of the five operational issues addressed by the private foundation
anti-abuse rules, self-dealing is the only one with a corollary in the public
charity context. In 1996, Congress determined that an "intermediate
sanction" was needed to allow the IRS to punish acts of private inurement at
public charities without necessarily revoking the charitable tax status of the
organization. Unlike the private foundation self-dealing approach, however,
donor advised funds, and supporting organizations from the definition of a qualified
charity). See IRC § 408(d)(8)(B)(i).
203. IRC § 170(e)(1). There is an exception for publicly traded securities.
IRC § 170(e)(5).
204. IRC § 170(e)(1)(iii). Congress used the private foundation rule as the
baseline for the deduction, but also provided that additional charitable deductions
were available depending on whether the contributed property produced income for
the charitable donee. See IRC § 170(m).
205. IRC § 170(e)(1)(iv). In addition, Congress adopted a special rule
relating to calculating the cost basis of taxidermy property. See IRC § 170(f)(15).
Congress took different approaches with respect to other types of noncash property
where valuation was an issue in the case of vehicles, easements, fractional
contributions, and clothing and household items.
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Congress adopted a more permissive regime for public charities, one which
generally allows transactions between a public charity and organization
insiders, so long as the transaction is at fair market value. By contrast, the
private foundation regime generally taxes most transactions between a
foundation and its insiders.206
The PPA, in addressing concerns about insider-dealing at donor
advised funds and supporting organizations, modified the public charity
intermediate sanctions rules by borrowing from the private foundation
approach. For example, certain transactions are subject to tax whether or not
at fair market value. Any grant, loan, compensation, or other similar payment
from a donor advised fund to a donor or donor adviser with respect to the
fund (or a related person) automatically is treated as an excess benefit
transaction, and, like the private foundation rules, the entire amount of the
transaction is considered an excess benefit, thus providing the base for the
tax.207 The modified rules also follow the private foundation approach by
specifying particular classes of "insider" instead of using a general
standard.208 In addition, a new excise tax was introduced with respect to
donor advised funds if charitable assets are used (pursuant to advice of a
donor or donor adviser) for the benefit of the donor or donor adviser. This
approach is akin to the private foundation self-dealing rule barring the use of
private foundation funds for the benefit of a disqualified person.209
Accordingly, at least with respect to two types of public charity, the
prevailing, more facts and circumstances-oriented intermediate sanctions
regime was considered insufficient, and the private foundation bright-line
approach of discouraging the transaction altogether was preferred.
(iii) Selective incorporation with respect to payouts and
business holding
Regarding payouts and business holdings, one issue was whether
donor advised funds and certain supporting organizations paid out funds
206. There is an exception for compensation, which is allowed if reasonable
and necessary. IRC § 4941 (d)(2)(E).
207. Compare IRC § 4958(c)(2), (c)(3)(A), with IRC § 4941(a)(1), (d)(1).
The rules do not fully embrace the private foundation approach, however. The
general fair market value approach of the intermediate sanctions rules is retained for
other transactions with insiders.
208. Compare IRC § 4958(c)(3)(B), (c)(3)(C), (f)(7), (f)(8) with IRC §
4946(a)(1). The intermediate sanctions rules generally define an insider as a person
with substantial influence over the affairs of the organization. IRC § 4958(f)(1). The
private foundation rules define particular kinds of insiders (substantial contributors,
managers, owners of related corporations). IRC 4946(a)(1).
209. Compare IRC § 4967, with IRC § 4941(d)(1)(E).
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regularly and in sufficient amounts for charitable purposes.21 o Another
related issue was whether the donor advised fund and supporting
organization could be abused by donors to retain assets for the benefit of the
donor (for example, to allow a donor to keep control of a business, or escape
the estate tax).2 1' The original Senate-passed bill contained detailed new pay-
out requirements on both donor advised funds and certain supporting
organizations, both of which were based on the private foundation payout
regime.212 Although the donor advised fund payout did not survive the
House-Senate negotiations, as a substitute, the private foundation excess
business holdings rules were applied to donor advised funds.213 In addition,
although the payout imposed on certain Type III supporting organizations
was taken out in the House-Senate negotiations, it was replaced by a
requirement that the Treasury Department provide for a payout in
regulations.2 14 The PPA also subjected certain supporting organizations to
the private foundation excess business holding rules.2 15 Accordingly, policy
issues typically of concern in the private foundation realm-payouts and
excess business holdings-became issues of concern for select types of
public charities, and the remedy sought was to adopt, in modified form, the
private foundation approach.2 16
210. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
211. Id.
212. Compare The Tax Relief Act of 2005, S. 2020, 109th Cong., § § 331,
342 (as passed by the Senate, Nov. 18, 2005), with IRC § 4942.
213. IRC § 4943(e)(1) ("For purposes of this section, a donor advised fund
... shall be treated as a private foundation.").
214. Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1241(d). The legislative history explained that
the purpose of the payout was "to ensure that a significant amount is paid" to the
supported charity. JCT PPA Technical Explanation, supra note 130, at 360. See
ANPRM Reg-155929-06, 2009-47 I.R.B. 665; Prop. Reg. 155929-06.
215. The Tax Relief Act of 2005, S. 2020, 109th Cong., § 344 (as passed by
the Senate, Nov. 18, 2005). See IRC § 4943(f) ("For purposes of this section,
[certain supporting organizations] shall be treated as a private foundation.").
216. Not long after the PPA was enacted, the issue came up immediately:
should the endowments of colleges and universities be subject to a payout? See e.g.,
Karen W. Arenson, Senate Looking at Endowments as Tuition Rises, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 25, 2008, at Al; Letter from Sens. Max Baucus and Charles Grassley to 136
Colleges and Universities (Jan. 24, 2008), available at http://nacua.org/documents/
BaucusGrassleyLetterReEndowments.pdf (asking questions about endowment and
spending policies). Colleges and universities accumulate funds, and the large
endowments at some institutions could exceed in the eyes of some the
reasonableness threshold. But colleges and universities present a much trickier
problem than donor advised funds or supporting organizations because they are
active charities, not passive grant-making organizations, and so the private
foundation model is not as apposite as it is with similarly situated, i.e., primarily
grant-making, charities. The recent dramatic decline in endowment value also makes
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(iv) Selective incorporation with respect to spending
Finally, the PPA looked to the private foundation rules for a
response to the issue of spending for non-charitable purposes. Under federal
tax law, if a public charity spends money not for a charitable purpose, there
are a number of possible consequences: nothing, revocation of charitable
status, or imposition of intermediate sanctions. Most likely, the answer will
turn out to be nothing because the intermediate sanctions regime applies only
to transactions with insiders of the charity and not to non-charitable spending
generally.217 And revocation of charitable status generally requires that the
violation show that the charity is no longer operated primarily for a
charitable purpose (a high threshold), which leaves doing nothing. If a
private foundation spends money for a non-charitable purpose, however,
there is a directly applicable remedy: imposition of an excise tax for a
"taxable expenditure." 218
The PPA adopted the private foundation concept of taxable
expenditures and applied it in the donor advised fund context. This was
accomplished by providing that a distribution by a donor advised fund to an
individual or for a non-charitable purpose is taxable. 2 19 Further borrowing
from the private foundation rules, the PPA provided that even distributions
that are for a charitable purpose nonetheless are taxable if made to a
organization other than a public charity and the distributing charity (termed a
"sponsoring organization") fails to conduct due diligence (termed
"expenditure responsibility") with respect to the distribution. 22 0 Accordingly,
at least with respect to donor advised funds, Congress determined that bright
lines backed by sanctions were necessary to control abuses in the expenditure
of charitable assets.
the issue politically less salient. Abby Goodnough, Hard Times at Harvard Are
Making Inroads Into Students' Lives, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2009, at A12; Andrew
Ross Sorkin, Investment Indigestion at Stanford, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 2009, at B l.
The broader point, however, is that the policy concern-unreasonable accumulation
of assets by a charity-is no longer relegated to the private charity. See also Sara E.
Waldeck, The Coming Showdown Over University Endowments: Enlisting the
Donors, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 1795 (2009).
217. IRC § 4958(c)(1) (defining an "excess benefit transaction" as one
between the charity and a "disqualified person").
218. IRC § 4945.
219. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, § 1231; IRC § 4966.




If nothing else, the recent Congressional actions described above
show two things: (1) if anti-abuse i-ules are to be applied to public charities,
the private foundation rules will be the initial model; and (2) the public
charity-private foundation distinction is breaking down. The first point may
reflect little more than legislative inertia: it is easiest first to look to existing
rules for solutions to present problems and extend them, than to craft brand-
new approaches. The second point, although an extension of the first, shows
that the more Congress borrows from the private foundation regime for
public charities, the less distinct public charities and private foundations
become, leading to further conceptual and technical complexity. With each
new scandal at public charities, the pressure will increase to extend the
private foundation anti-abuse rules to cover the new scandal.
The trouble with the selective incorporation approach, however, is
that it neglects to address the underlying issues. Granted that our current
system treats some charities better than others, does the current basis for
doing so make sense? Should we assume that some charities are inherently
deserving of "better" treatment because of their function, or sources of
support? Or can we draw different lines? Rather than selectively
incorporating aspects of the private foundation regime to public charities, a
more sensible approach would be to reexamine the basis for the distinction
altogether and analyze each abuse currently regulated and decide the extent
to which the abuse remains a concern, and if so, with respect to what types of
charities. Should all charities be subject to an excise tax for non-charitable
spending? Should there be tax consequences to imprudent investing? Should
we distinguish charities for purposes of the charitable deduction, not just on
the basis of whether they are operating charities (as opposed to primarily
grant-making), but also depending on the type of charity provided? Although
answering these questions is beyond the scope of this Article, what can be
concluded here is that the scandals and the legislative response show that it is
time to make it a priority to reexamine the public charity-private foundation
distinction.
D. Toward Brighter Enforcement Lines
A common response to the reported scandals was for more and better
enforcement of the laws. With over 1.1 million charitable organizations, an
IRS exempt organization staff of about 830,221 and an audit rate of less than
221. Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division-Exempt
Organizations, IRS, Annual Report and FY 2009 Work Plan (2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/finalannualrptworkplanl l_25_08.pdf. IRS exempt
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one-half of one percent,222 there is much to be said for more enforcement.
But one of the difficulties with the "more enforcement" argument, apart from
223the political question of resources, is the question of what exactly would
the IRS enforce? On the private foundation side, there is considerable federal
tax law to enforce, and the Boston Globe investigators were able easily to
uncover what appeared to be facial violations of some of the private
foundation rules.224 A more robust enforcement presence certainly could
have an impact on some private foundation abuses.22S
organization staff are of course responsible not just for charitable organizations but
other nonprofits as well.
222. See supra note 8.
223. Originally, the excise tax on the net investment income of private
foundations (IRC § 4940) was intended to fund enforcement of the law for all
charitable organizations. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of
the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 29 (Joint Comm. Print 1970). But this never came to
pass. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 2 Study of the Overall State of the Federal
Tax System and Recommendations for Simplification, 459 (Joint Comm. Print
2001). During the mid 2000s, the budget for the Tax Exempt and Government
Entities Division of the IRS (TE-GE) increased, reflecting the priority Commissioner
Everson made of the area and a receptive audience on Capitol Hill for such increased
enforcement. However, a modest increase in resources is not likely to result in a
dramatic increase in enforcement. The main purpose of the IRS is to collect taxes;
and accordingly the resources of the IRS are primarily going to be devoted to large
and wealthy taxpayers, not to parties that do not pay taxes. It is why, in the charitable
sector, State enforcement can be critical to prevent abuse of public trust. However,
States in general do not have large or active charity enforcement bureaus. See
Charity Oversight and Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. 2
(2004) (statement of Mark Pacella, President, National Association of State Charity
Officials) ("Despite their broad authority over charitable assets and fiduciaries, many
states lack the resources to effectively regulate the charitable organizations operating
within their jurisdictions. Of our fifty states, less than half are able to be regular and
active participants in NASCO's annual conferences and most do not have personnel
dedicated to the exclusive regulation of charities."); see also Marion R. Fremont-
Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law and Regulation
(2004). In recognition of the institutional and other problems relating to
enforcement, some in the charitable community have argued for a new separate
enforcement agency for charities, or for increased federal funding for State
enforcement efforts. See, e.g., Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys:
Regulation of the Charitable Sector Through a Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19
Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1 (2009); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson,
Regulating Charities in the 21st Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 479 (2010).
224. See supra note 92.
225. Regarding private foundations, the best Congress could do here was to
double the rates of excise tax that apply to the private foundation anti-abuse rules.
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But it is different for public charities. As noted earlier, there are no
meaningful affirmative obligations on a public charity,226 few anti-abuse
rules, and so not much really to enforce except broad purpose requirements
or negative restrictions that depend intensively on facts and circumstances
determinations: for example, no private inurement, no private benefit, 227 no
intervention in a political campaign, and no substantial lobbying.228
Further, because of the all-or-nothing nature of charitable tax
exemption, enforcement of any of the cardinal federal rules of charity tax law
generally means revocation of charitable status, a step with political
ramifications and one that, with respect to large or established charities, may
simply be unreasonable for the IRS to take. The chief exception to revocation
as the exclusive sanction is the intermediate sanctions rules, but these are
fairly generous as compared to the private foundation rules on self-dealing
(except in the case of compensation), 2 29 are process-oriented, and fairly
limited in scope.
Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, §1212, IRC §§ 4941(a)(1), (a)(2), & (c)(2),
4942(a), 4943(a)(1), 4944(a) & (d)(2), 4945(a) & (c)(2).
226. The only affirmative obligation on a private foundation is to pay out a
percentage of its assets each year--enforced by an excise tax. IRC § 4942.
227. A component of the requirement that charitable organizations be
operated exclusively for exempt purposes is that the organization be operated for a
public interest, not a private interest. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). If an
organization is found to operate for a private benefit, it loses charitable status. See,
e.g., Am. Campaign Acad. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
228. With respect to lobbying, charities that make an election under §
501(h) of the Code are subject to an extensive set of regulatory rules, and so not
subject to the default facts and circumstances "no substantial part" test. In addition,
one area where there is a fair amount of Code-based law to enforce, the unrelated
business income tax (UBIT), was not a primary topic of concern in the 2000s. But
even here, catching evasion for UBIT is made difficult by generous allocation rules
that make it fairly easy for a charity to defend allocating what should be considered
an expense for a charitable activity to an unrelated business activity-thus creating a
deduction for UBIT purposes, and reducing or eliminating tax. See e.g., JCT
Historical Development, supra note 5, at 105.
229. IRC § 4941(d)(2)(E) (payment of compensation to a disqualified
person is not self dealing if the compensation is not excessive). Compare IRC §
4958(c)(1) (defining an excess benefit as occurring when the benefit provided
exceeds the consideration received), with IRC § 4941(d) (defining self-dealing in
absolute terms, e.g., "any direct or indirect sale or exchange, or leasing of
property. . .").
230. See generally, Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and
Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 735, 736 (2007) (noting that
"[u]ltimately, the intermediate sanctions provisions are all about process, not
substance" and examining whether the scope of the sanctions should be widened to
cover non-insider transactions).
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In addition, one consequence of the breadth of the charitable
designation is that once the IRS grants charitable tax exemption, the
presumption of charitability is extended indefinitely or until the IRS makes a
determination that revocation of charitable status is appropriate. That is, loss
of charitable status will occur at the earlier of: the organization's termination
or conversion to another tax status, or an affirmative act by the IRS to
revoke. In the meantime (which for most organizations is a long time), there
is little that the IRS can do by way of sanction. Accordingly, one would
expect over time to see a charitable sector that expands, especially as the
definition of charity evolves. And that is, of course, what we have seen. 23 ' In
short, given the growth of the charitable sector, the scandals raised the issue
of additional enforcement tools (and resources). And perhaps most
importantly, considering that resources are finite and not ever likely to be up
to the task of regulating such a large and diverse sector, more effective
enforcement might well depend on a new legislative approach to charity:
brighter lines and, perhaps, positive requirements.
There is evidence that the legislative policy is beginning to shift in
this direction. Precise standards imposed on credit counseling organizations
and the modified intermediate sanctions rules that apply to donor advised
funds and supporting organizations are each modest confessions that
additional enforcement tools are needed to police certain abuses. In addition,
these provisions show a preference for brighter lines in enforcement over the
prevailing facts and circumstances or value-based standards for imposition of
sanctions.
Even stronger evidence of a shift is found in a new and prohibitive
rule designed to stop participation by tax-exempt organizations in tax shelter
transactions. The provision, enacted as part of TIPRA,232 imposed a 100
percent excise tax on proceeds attributable to knowing participation by a tax-
exempt organization in a "prohibited tax shelter transaction," which is a
transaction identified by the Treasury Department as such (technically, as a
"listed transaction"). 23 3 Notably, the tax applies even absent knowing
conduct, though the rate is reduced in such cases to 35 percent. Further, if the
transaction becomes a prohibited transaction after the exempt organization
enters into it, an excise tax of 35 percent applies to proceeds attributable to
231. See JCT Historical Development, supra note 5, at 18-26 (charting the
growth of the charitable sector from 1975 to 2005).
232. Pub. L. No. 109-222, 120 Stat. 345; IRC § 4965. See supra note 128.
233. See, e.g., Notice 2009-59, 2009-31 I.R.B. 170 ("Transactions that are
the same as or substantially similar to one of the types of transactions described in
the list .. . have been determined by the Service to be tax avoidance transactions....
As a result, taxpayers may need to disclose their participation in these listed
transactions ... and material advisors may need to disclose these transactions. . . .
Taxpayers [and material advisors] who fail to disclose may be subject to
penalties. . .. ").
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the transaction and allocable to the period after the transaction became a
prohibited transaction.234
In enacting this provision, more than any of the other reform
provisions, Congress changed the ground rules for tax-exempt status. As a
policy matter, the provision stands for the proposition that it is fundamentally
inconsistent with tax-exempt status to engage in conduct that enables tax
evasion. True to form, it is a negative restriction, but unlike some of the other
broad negative restrictions (no substantial lobbying, no political
intervention), it was written with a strong deterrent that does not require
revocation of tax-exempt status. 235 And consistent with the anti-abuse
approaches taken with respect to donor advised funds and supporting
organizations (following the private foundation approach), the rule in effect
stops the transaction, without allowance for much in the way of facts and
circumstances ambivalence. In short, the rule provides the IRS with a strong,
previously lacking, enforcement tool.2 36
234. IRC § 4965.
235. Similar to the unrelated business income tax rules, the provision
tolerates transgressions to tax exempt status (i.e., exemption is not revoked); but
unlike the UBIT, in the case of tax shelter transactions, any income knowingly
derived therefrom must be confiscated. IRC § 4965(a)(1)(B). In general, if the
conduct was not knowing, the tax rate is identical to the UBIT rate. IRC §
4965(a)(1)(A). The tax is an excise tax, not an income tax, and so fundamentally is
about deterrence. With the UBIT, deterrence is not the underlying rationale, except
that unrelated business activity may not become an organization's primary activity.
236. By providing the IRS with broad authority to define which transactions
will trigger the tax, the provision may be criticized because it introduces
considerable uncertainty for exempt organizations. This is because the tax applies to
transactions that were not announced by the IRS as prohibited at the time the
organization entered into the transaction. But arguably, without so providing, this
uncertainty is precisely what the provision was aimed at: exempt organizations will,
or should, think twice before entering into a transaction that promises atypical
returns, or that asks of little or no investment from the organization apart from the
act of their participation (i.e., apart from contributing their tax exempt status). See
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-455, at 129-132 (2005). Importantly, although the tax
applies to transactions that were not "listed" at the time entered into but subsequently
become listed, only income attributable to the post-listing period is subject to tax.
Accordingly, the organization has a choice: it can unwind from the listed transaction
or pay tax on income attributable to it from the time of listing. There is a risk of
course that the IRS will abuse its discretion by listing transactions that are not
abusive and so chill legitimate investment decisions. However, such a risk is low,
and anyway beside the point. The conduct targeted by the TIPRA provision is
investment conduct that seems or should seem too good to be true; and to encourage
due diligence. An exempt organization now should check current lists of suspect
transactions, and in addition, factor in possible future taxes on proceeds as part of the
return on investment before deciding whether to participate in suspect transactions.
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Going forward, the question is the extent to which this trend will
continue. Although bright lines can have inequitable outcomes, their
administrative appeal is manifest. As the public charity-private foundation
distinction breaks down and the charitable sector continues to grow, there
will be increasing pressure for more certainty in tax enforcement through
237imposition of bright-line rules.
PART V. CONCLUSION: A DAMAGED CHARITABLE
FORM AND FRAMEWORK
This Article has been an effort to take a bird's eye view of the
charitable designation in federal tax law. In general, over the course of a
century, notwithstanding years of experience with charitable organizations
and dramatic change in the scope and diversity of the charitable sector, and
so of the aggregate value of the tax benefits, most legal change has been in
the form of negative requirements or process-oriented positive requirements
and not in the imposition of substantive positive obligations. Although the
initial charitable designation of 1913 has been significantly restricted in
many ways, key fundamental traits have remained relatively untouched: the
broad purpose-based approach to qualification as charitable, the all-or-
nothing approach to enforcement for public charities, and the policy of
linking multiple tax benefits to a determination of charitable under section
501(c)(3). The result has been a large, growing, and diverse charitable sector.
And, as described in this Article, the result also has been a sector, especially
with respect to public charities, that is proving increasingly difficult to
oversee.
237. It is interesting to compare the Congressional response to the tax
shelter problem with the response to another attack on the charitable form-abusive
charitable contributions of noncash property. For noncash contributions, the
legislative response was targeted and not comprehensive. Presented with an option
of eliminating the deduction for many noncash contributions, instead special rules
were adopted for each type of property in question: something akin to whack-a-mole.
Thus, there are now separate rules of contributions of vehicles, intellectual property,
fagade easements, fractional contributions, clothing and household items, and
taxidermy. The probable outcome, as in whack-a-mole, will be that moles will keep
popping out of new holes. Indeed, shortly after passage of the PPA, a new scheme
involving contribution of noncash property arose, prompting the IRS to list the
transaction as a "transaction of interest." See Notice 2007-72, 2007-2 C.B. 544
(involving "transaction... in which a taxpayer directly or indirectly acquires certain
rights in real property or in an entity that directly or indirectly holds real property,
transfers the rights more than one year after the acquisition to an organization
described in § 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, and claims a charitable
contribution deduction under § 170 that is significantly higher than the amount that
the taxpayer paid to acquire the rights").
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The evidence is all around us. The reported scandals of early this
century surveyed in Part III of this Article are symptoms of a charitable form
that is under stress. More importantly, the resulting reform legislation,
analyzed in Part IV, shows that the law is wrestling with the remaining
legacies of the initial charitable designation. The clear trends that emerge
from the reform legislation are frustration with the breadth of the standard
under section 501(c)(3) and with the all-or-nothing, facts and circumstances-
based means of enforcement. The result is piecemeal reform: a fragmentation
of the charitable sector based on purpose (but an unwillingness or inability to
measure the purpose), and a gradual but selective blending of the public
charity-private foundation distinction. This piecemeal reform approach has
some predictive capacity. As new scandals are reported, the law will
continue to shift in the direction now cast-following the lead of credit
counseling organizations and hospitals, and further disaggregating the sector.
And the law likely will continue to borrow anti-abuse measures from the
private foundation regime and selectively apply them to public charities on a
case-by-case basis.
Such piecemeal reform, certain to have detractors, nevertheless
should be viewed as a consequence of Congress's reluctance to impose
substantive positive obligations on charitable organizations. In the absence of
a positive standard for charity and a growing charitable sector, when it comes
to oversight, there is little choice but to draw additional lines; and these lines,
if based on form and not substance, will place greater emphasis on functional
categories and process: such as process-oriented exemption standards,
governance initiatives, greater disclosure and transparency,-and brighter
enforcement lines to police abuses. And this is what we are seeing.
While we may continue on this path, it is also time to begin
developing a clearer idea of the type of organization that should be supported
by the tax system, and, critically, to what extent. One barrier to such an
inquiry, however, is one of the remaining, largely unquestioned historical
characteristics of the charitable designation: placing the basis for multiple tax
benefits under one section, that of section 501(c)(3). Because the tax benefits
are packaged together, the all-or-nothing approach to exemption becomes yet
more problematic: an organization stands to lose not only tax exemption, but
also eligibility to receive deductible contributions, access to tax-exempt
financing, and likely other federal regulatory benefits and other substantial
benefits under state law. For enforcement purposes, with so much residing on
the determination of whether an organization may remain "charitable," it is
that much harder to reach an adverse conclusion. Further, the bundling of the
tax benefits also may contribute to a reluctance to impose substantive
positive requirements. On its terms, section 501(c)(3) is a test for tax
exemption only, i.e., application for charitable status is not per se an
application for eligibility for the charitable deduction, or access to other
federal and state tax and nontax benefits. So to a certain extent, we may
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require less in the way of positive requirements to achieve "charitable" status
because the facial question is "what standard should apply for purposes of
tax exemption." If instead we asked the question "what standard should
apply for purposes of being eligible to receive deductible contributions," we
might get a different answer, and perhaps impose more positive
requirements, depending on the public benefit of the organization's activity.
Accordingly, one modest step in the direction of making more sense of the
relationship between the tax system and charitable organizations would be to
unpackage, or delink, the tax benefits. This might also lead the way toward a
more deliberate sense of the public benefit to be provided in exchange for
one or more tax preferences.
Ultimately, one lesson from the scandals and the resulting legislation
is that we are trying to make one standard, that of tax exemption, do too
much. The reason we care about the charitable designation is not because of
tax exemption. Many non-charitable organizations are exempt from federal
income tax, and exemption probably is not, standing alone, an exceptional
tax benefit for these organizations. Rather, the principal reasons we care
about the charitable designation are because of the many benefits, in addition
to income tax exemption, associated with it, and because of the expectation
that the public should derive a benefit from an organization designated as
charitable. And this points to a principal weakness of current law, whether
the standard for tax exemption, as articulated in section 501(c)(3) of the
Code, can continue to support the many tax and other benefits it engenders.
Chances are that until there is more comprehensive change to the way in
which charitable organizations are regulated, the scandals of the 2000s will
be repeated in form if not substance.
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